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JUST AND SPEEDY: ON CIVIL DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
FOR LUDDITE LAWYERS
Michael Thomas Murphy*

INTRODUCTION
The next twenty years are likely to see greater transformation in how the American (and world)
legal professions are organized and ply their services than was true for any comparable period
in history. We have two choices. We can try to impede these forces in order to preserve a
familiar and comfortable world that seems to be slipping away. Or we can decide that today’s
rules should adapt to accommodate and direct the forces at bay in order to preserve the values
of the American bar, which include the efficient delivery of services at reasonable cost. **

Lawyers have long had a reputation for being technological “luddites.”
Junior attorneys routinely complain about “old school” attorneys ordering
work done the old-fashioned way, which can be dependable but inefficient.
It is this tension, dependability against efficiency, which drives the “luddite
lawyer” stereotype. Luddite lawyers using outdated technology have
traditionally faced a client relationship or ethical issue; case law shows that
luddite lawyering can even be considered unethical conduct, ineffective
assistance, and malpractice. 1 Recent rule changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) increase the stakes by prescribing a requirement
for technical proficiency, 2 raising the question: could luddite lawyering also
rise to the level of civil sanctions? This Article explores this question.
Such sanctions would most likely be found in the fertile realm of
electronic discovery. Evidentiary information in legal disputes has grown
considerably in size and complexity. Managing that information in litigation

* Clinical Supervisor and Lecturer in Law at the Entrepreneurship Legal Clinic, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. For Meg and for Bubbles the Basset Hound, who is a good dog. Thanks to my
Fall 2016 and 2017 Electronic Discovery classes at the Thomas R. Kline School of Law at Drexel
University for listening and engaging.
** Stephen Gillers, A Profession, If You Can Keep It: How Information Technology and Fading
Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We Should Do About It, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 953,
953 (2012).
1 Cf., e.g., Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 623 (D. Colo.
2007) (“Given the dynamic nature of electronically stored information, prudent counsel would be wise to
ensure that a demand letter sent to a putative party also addresses any contemporaneous preservation
obligations.”).
2 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (guiding courts to “order measures no greater than necessary to cure the
prejudice” where “electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or
conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it”).
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has greatly increased costs, given rise to sanctions, 3 and made lawyers feel
like they must be IT professionals. 4 There is evidence that sanctions for
electronic discovery misconduct—often for spoliation, the improper deletion
of data relevant to discovery—come as much from lawyers’ struggles with
speaking the language of technology as from intentional misrepresentations
to the court.5 This Article thus examines the idea of civil sanctions for luddite
lawyers who fail to use technology in the practice of electronic discovery.
Part I examines the formal requirements for lawyers to stay abreast of
technology through a survey of recent rule changes to the Model Rules of
Ethics (adopted by many states) and academic and practical commentary. It
looks to the proliferation of electronic discovery as a cause of this trend,
because electronic discovery is an area of law where sophisticated
technological knowledge has become a core competency in adequately
litigating disputes. It also discusses revised Rule 1 to the FRCP, which
charges parties, their attorneys, and judges to take steps to ensure the “just,
speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of disputes. 6 This change is seemingly
impossible to meet without technological competence.
Part II surveys the practice of sanctioning attorneys. It describes an
increasing trend in sanctioning attorneys for misconduct in litigation
discovery. It shows that, if one reads Rule 1 of the FRCP together with the
Model Rules of Ethics and traditional sanctioning powers, judges can
theoretically sanction lawyers under those traditional sanctioning powers for
ignoring modern technology or refusing to employ it. This Part finds a
plausible hypothetical model for such sanctioning while taking note of
courts’ general reluctance to sanction attorney behavior.
3 Cf. Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling Practice and
the Resolution of Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing Information, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
719, 721 (2012) (“[T]he [modern] controversial heightened pleading standard . . . is expressly designed
to protect certain defendants from the ‘burdens of discovery,’ which are said to be ‘sprawling, costly and
hugely time-consuming.’”).
4 See Daniel R. Miller & Bree Kelly, E-Discovery in 2015: Will You Feel the Earth Move Under
Your Feet?, LEGAL INSIGHT, Jan., 2015 at 2; accord James v. Nat’l Fin. LLC, No. 8931-VCL, 2014 WL
6845560, at *12–13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 2014) (“Professed technological incompetence is not an excuse for
discovery misconduct.”).
5 Entire well-researched law review articles have been written to instruct attorneys on the
technology they need to operate their firms. See, e.g., Stacey Blaustein et al., Digital Direction for the
Analog Attorney—Data Protection, E-Discovery, and the Ethics of Technological Competence in Today’s
World of Tomorrow, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH., May 2016, at 1, 2–3.
6 See, e.g., Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union, 212
F.R.D. 178, 222, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (awarding sanctions when counsel, among many other things,
“delegated document production to a lay-person who . . . did not even understand himself (and was not
instructed by counsel) that a document included a draft or other non-identical copy, a computer file and
an email”); Robert E. Shapiro, Advance Sheet: Conclusion Assumed, 36 LITIGATION 59, 59 (2010)
(“Spoliation, in case you haven’t heard, is the newest battleground of contemporary litigation, now a
continuing sideshow, if not the main event, in courtrooms across the country.”); Dan H. Willoughby, Jr.
et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 805–07 (2010).
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Part III examines three situations in which luddite-related sanctions
could occur. It considers (1) the failure to employ accepted technology in
document review and production, such as analytics or predictive coding; (2)
the failure to produce documents in searchable electronic form; and (3) the
failure to search publicly accessible databases to gain information supporting
a matter (a “duty to Google” and discover information from third parties).
Part IV ties luddite lawyering to the tendency of attorneys to rely too
much on outdated methods, which provide a certain dependability of results.
The Article concludes by arguing that sanctioning luddite lawyers may help
overcome that obstacle and satisfy revised Rule 1’s charge to participants in
the legal system.
THE LEGAL INDUSTRY’S ANTI-LUDDITE TREND

I.

Lawyers are “bad” at technology. It is an axiom and stereotype that has
permeated pop culture, 7 academia,8 and practical publications. 9 Lawyers
confused by technology “‘fail to optimize the tools they have, let alone take
advantage of the most appropriate tools available.’”10 This failure is a serious
7

Commentators have cheekily cited the classic Saturday Night Live character “Unfrozen Caveman
Lawyer,” who comically failed to understand modern technology. See Karin S. Jenson, Coleman W.
Watson & James A. Sherer, Ethics, Technology, and Attorney Competence, BAKER HOSTETLER BLOG 1,
1
n.2
(2014),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/cle/materials/eDiscovery/2014/frimorndocs/EthicsIneDiscoveryBakerH
ostetler.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFR6-VZNG] (“Sometimes when I get a message on my fax machine, I
wonder: ‘Did little demons get inside and type it?’ I don’t know! My primitive mind can’t grasp these
concepts.” (quoting Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer, SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE TRANSCRIPTS,
http://snltranscripts.jt.org/91/91gcaveman.phtml (last visited Oct. 3, 2017))).
8 See, e.g., Darla W. Jackson, Lawyers Can’t Be Luddites Anymore: Do Law Librarians Have a
Role in Helping Lawyers Adjust to the New Ethics Rules Involving Technology?, 105 L. LIBR. J. 395, 395–
96 (2013); Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 49, 61–62
(2015) (recognizing “technological competence” as essential to modern legal work); Ronald D. Rotunda,
Applying the Revised ABA Model Rules in the Age of the Internet: The Problem of Metadata, 42 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 175, 175–76 (2013) (examining how increases in technology have made inadvertent disclosures
of confidential information far more common).
9 See Darla Jackson, Can Lawyers Be Luddites? Adjusting to the Modification of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Regarding Technology, 84 OKLA. B.J. 2637, 2637 (2013); James Podgers,
Lawyers Struggle to Reconcile New Technology with Traditional Ethics Rules, ABA J. (Nov. 1, 2014,
5:55
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_fundamentals_lawyers_struggle_to_reconcile_new_tec
hnology_with_traditio/; Breaking News: Blockbuster Sanctions Order Spotlights the Importance of
eDiscovery Competence, RECOMMIND: MIND OVER MATTERS BLOG (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://www.recommind.com/blog/breaking-news-blockbuster-sanctions-order-spotlights-importanceediscovery-competence [hereinafter Recommind Article] (discussing HM Elecs., Inc. v. RF Techs., Inc.,
No. 12cv2884–BAS–MDD, 2015 WL 4714908, at *8 (S.D. Cal., Aug. 7, 2015)).
10 Catherine J. Lanctot, Becoming a Competent 21st Century Legal Ethics Professor: Everything
You Always Wanted to Know About Technology (but Were Afraid to Ask), 2015. J. PROF. LAW. 75, 82–83

2017]

JUST AND SPEEDY

39

problem in a competitive client-service industry. Some in-house counsels
have conducted technological audits of law firms, finding widespread
deficiency and stating that “lawyers in general are woefully deficient in using
the software tools at their disposal.”11
In litigation, the failure to use available technology can cost parties and
courts enormous amounts of time and money. One federal magistrate judge,
David Waxse, echoed the widelyheld sentiment that “litigation today is a
method of resolving disputes that is too costly and time consuming for most
parties involved.”12 Judge Waxse listed the major causes of runaway
litigation costs as “(1) the volume of electronically stored information (ESI)
involved in litigation, (2) the lack of technical competence by counsel, and
(3) the lack of cooperation among counsel in litigation.” 13
Judge Waxse’s first two points provide the inspiration for this Article,
which aims to provide a theoretical basis for judges to use the FRCP to
compel lawyers to gain and maintain the technological knowledge necessary
to adequately administer electronic discovery. Electronic discovery is easily
the most costly and technologically demanding area of litigation, 14 and there
is skepticism amongst the bench and bar about attorneys’ ability to stay
abreast of the latest technology. 15 In 2016, 63 percent of judges and
experienced practitioners responding to a survey disagreed with the
statement that “[t]he typical attorney possesses the subject matter knowledge
(legal and technical) required to effectively counsel clients on e-discovery

(2015) (quoting Report of the Task Force on the Future of the Legal Profession, 2011 N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N
99).
11 D. Casey Flaherty, Could You Pass This In-House Counsel’s Tech Test? If the Answer Is No, You
May Be Losing Business, ABA J.: LEGAL REBELS (July 17, 2013, 1:30 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/could_you_pass_this_in-house_counsels_tech_test
(describing an audit of external counsel testing basic computer tasks).
12 Hon. David J. Waxse, Advancing the Goals of a “Just, Speedy and Inexpensive” Determination
of Every Action: The Recent Changes to the District of Kansas Guidelines for Cases Involving
Electronically Stored Information, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 111 (2013); see also Gordon W. Netzorg
& Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather than the Exception, 87 DENV. U.
L. REV. 513, 517–18 (2010) (discussing a tension between broad discovery and just, speedy resolution of
disputes).
13 Waxse, supra note 12, at 111.
14 Id. at 118 (“With about one percent of civil cases in federal court going to trial, most of the time
and money is being spent in discovery and not trial.”); Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 3, at 721
(“[T]he [modern] controversial heightened pleading standard . . . is expressly designed to protect certain
defendants from the ‘burdens of discovery,’ which are said to be ‘sprawling, costly and hugely timeconsuming.’” (first quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670 (2009); then quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007))).
15 See Aebra Coe, Judges Lack Faith in Attys’ E-Discovery Skills, Survey Says, LAW360 (Jan. 28.
2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/751961/judges-lack-faith-in-attys-e-discovery-skills-surveysays. The survey in question was by Exterro, an electronic discovery company, of a number of judges and
electronic discovery specialists.
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matters.”16 This was actually an improvement (of sorts) from the 65 percent
that disagreed with that statement when surveyed in 2015. 17 In 2016, a
different sampling of a similar size showed that 72 percent of judges
somewhat or completely disagreed with the statement that a typical attorney
had sufficient knowledge to litigate electronic discovery, and over 90 percent
of practitioners disagreed with that statement. 18 When asked whether they
witnessed “significant e-discovery mistakes” among litigants or by other
attorneys or parties, 27 percent of attorneys stated “sometimes,” 45 percent
“often,” and 18 percent “almost every case”; judges have also seen electronic
discovery mistakes from the bench, with 21 percent noting they occurred
“often,” and 57 percent noting they occurred “sometimes.” 19 The survey
concluded in early 2017 that “[f]or the third year in a row, judges do not feel
the typical attorney has the required knowledge to be effectively counseling
clients on e-discovery matters.”20
Judge Waxse stated bluntly:
A . . . contributing factor to why ESI has made litigation more expensive and time-consuming
is the general lack of technical competence by counsel. As a judge responsible for case
management, I have observed too many lawyers who do not have the necessary competence
with technology to properly represent their clients in litigation that involves e-discovery. 21

Unfortunately for the bar, “big data” has made its mark on litigation,
and most information at play in modern discovery is electronic. 22 Newlycreated information is almost entirely digital, and electronically-created and
stored information is so ubiquitous in litigation that electronic discovery is
no longer a legal specialty; it is just the way of things. 23 In other words, the
16

3rd Annual Federal Judges Survey: E-Discovery Advice for Becoming a Better Attorney,
EXTERRO 8 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.exterro.com/judges-survey-17/.
17 Federal Judges and Leading Attorneys Largely Agree on the State of E-Discovery, EXTERRO 1
(Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.exterro.com/about/news-events/federal-judges-and-leading-attorneyslargely-agree-on-the-state-of-e-discovery/.
18 2nd Annual Federal Judges Survey: Views from Both Sides of the Bench, EXTERRO 11 (2016),
http://www.exterro.com/judges-survey-16/.
19 Id. at 13.
20 3rd Annual Federal Judges Survey, supra note 16, at 3.
21 Waxse, supra note 12, at 113.
22 See Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the
Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. Spring 2007, at 1, 2
(“Discovery of electronic information is now an everyday fact of litigation in the U.S. Advances in
computer software and hardware (e.g., e-mail, instant messaging, voicemail, blogs, laptops, .pdfs, PDAs,
zip or flash drives, databases, and network servers) have greatly increased the ability to generate, replicate,
circulate, and accumulate electronic information.”).
23 See Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy E-Discovery Seas, 10
RICH. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2004, at 67, 69 (“In the world in general, 99.99% of information being
generated is in non-printed form . . .‘70[%] of corporate records may be stored in electronic format, and
30[%] of electronic information is never printed to paper.’” (quoting The Sedona Principles: Best
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bench and bar will soon drop the “e” from “e-discovery.”24 In the near future,
if not the present, understanding electronic discovery will be as integral to
competent lawyering as understanding the standard for a motion to dismiss. 25
As one state bar noted, “[n]ot every litigated case involves electronic
discovery. Yet, in today’s technological world, almost every litigation matter
potentially does.” 26 Understanding electronic discovery in many instances
requires a working knowledge of information systems and the various forms
of electronic communication. 27 Information systems and communication
methods often move faster than legal decisions and rules. 28
Judges are now experienced and sophisticated in understanding these
systems. A recent poll of the experienced practitioners and judges notes that
82 percent of respondents rated the judiciary’s understanding of electronic
discovery “Good” or “Ok,” and 5 percent rated it “Strong.” 29 Magistrate
Judge John Facciola opined that “[t]he consequences for counsel are obvious.
They are facing a bench that knows what it is doing and appreciates how the
technology can render the discovery process cheaper and more efficient.” 30
If lawyers are bad at technology, and capably litigating disputes now
requires a professional-grade grasp of technology, the bar faces a systemic
Practices Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, SEDONA
CONF. 3 (Jan. 2004), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/miscFiles/SedonaPrinciples200401)); Mazza
et al., supra note 22, at 4 (“It is not infrequent for a terabyte (i.e., 1,000 gigabytes, 1 million megabytes,
or 500 billion typewritten pages) of ESI to be at issue in large civil litigation or in government
investigations.”). The Mazza article was written in 2007, and it is likely that the average volume of
discovery is much higher now.
24 See, e.g., Stephanie Wilkins Pugsley, eDiscovery: It’s Time to Drop the “e,” 27 UTAH B.J., July–
Aug. 2014, at 14, 14; Eric Choi & Gregory Leighton, New Federal Rules Acknowledge It’s Time to Drop
the “E,” LAW360, (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/730631/new-federal-rulesacknowledge-it-s-time-to-drop-the-e; John Tredennick, My Prediction for 2014: E-Discovery Is Dead –
Long Live Discovery!, CATAYLST BLOG (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.catalystsecure.com/blog/2014/01/myprediction-for-2014-e-discovery-is-dead-long-live-discovery/.
25 See Pugsley, supra note 24, at 14 (“Many lawyers claim not to ‘do’ [electronic discovery].
However, the basic information needed to do our jobs was born in an electronic format. Like it or not,
attorneys are ‘doing eDiscovery.’ To ignore this fact is to ‘do it’ wrong.”).
26 Cal. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 193, 3 (2015)
[hereinafter Cal. Bar Op.] (laying out extensive ethical obligations for attorneys in electronic discovery
cases).
27 See Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 3 (“The explosive growth of ESI has changed the very nature
of discovery, with new electronic complexities making the preservation and production of evidence far
more challenging.”). The authors elaborated that the difficulty of understanding electronically stored
information is compounded by its ephemeral nature. It can be altered easily or deleted without intent, and
can also persist after apparent deletion—characteristics not generally found in hard copy. Id. It also can
require an understanding of translating or operating technology to access. Id. at 4.
28 See id. at 31 (“There is a perception that discovery of electronic information is the ‘wild, wild
west’ of modern litigation. This largely may be due to the fact that the development of technologies used
in the discovery of electronic information far outpaces the developing law of discovery.”).
29 3rd Annual Federal Judges Survey, supra note 16, at 12.
30 Id.
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crisis. As such, there is a trend to extinguish the luddite lawyer. 31 The
California State Bar Association (“CSBA”) surveyed the state of law and
technology and concluded that “[l]egal rules and procedures, when placed
alongside ever-changing technology, produce professional challenges that
attorneys must meet to remain competent.” 32
A.

The Inclusion of an Attorney’s Technological Competence in the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct

One such professional challenge, and the best evidence of the trend
against luddite lawyering, is that in many states technical incompetence is an
ethical violation. 33 Rule 1.1 of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model
Rules of Professional Conduct describes general attorney competence in
simple terms, stating that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” 34
In 2009, the ABA created a “Commission on Ethics 20/20” to review the
model rules in light of changing technology and globalization. 35 As a result
of that review, the ABA added language to Comment 8 of Rule 1.1 in 2012:
To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the
law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology,
engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education
requirements to which the lawyer is subject. 36

The Commission concluded that technology has changed “how lawyers
conduct investigations, engage in legal research, advise their clients, and
31 See Christopher C. Popper, Embracing Technology in the Legal Profession: Technology-Related
2013 Changes to the Delaware Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct 2 (Apr. 2, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2244451 (“[A] [] lawyer is now
compelled to at least consider implementing certain types of technology, and whether the benefits of such
technology outweigh the risks.”).
32 Cal. Bar Op., supra note 26, at 3 (laying out extensive ethical obligations for attorneys in
electronic discovery cases). One state supreme court justice even looked inward and noted in dicta that
judges must know and understand the distinction between printed information and metadata since that
distinction is “critical, both on an ethical and adjudicative basis,” which is a worrisome development as
metadata becomes increasingly more common in courts. State v. Ratliff, 849 N.W.2d 183, 196 (N.D.
2014) (Crothers, J., concurring).
33 See, e.g., OHIO RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2017); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (2005); WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2016).
34 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
35 John G. Browning, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—Oh My! The ABA Ethics 20/20
Commission and Evolving Ethical Issues in the Use of Social Media, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 255, 258–59
(2013).
36 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (emphasis added).
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conduct discovery. These tasks now require lawyers to have a firm grasp on
how electronic information is created, stored, and retrieved.” 37 This
conclusion is akin to Judge Waxse’s sentiment that lawyers have an ethical
obligation to at least keep up with technology and to be fairly sophisticated
when that technology is essential to their practice. 38 Keeping abreast of
technology is necessary to be adequate. Excellent lawyers must have an
extremely strong grasp of technology. 39
There is some debate over whether Comment 8 effectuated an increase
in a lawyer's ethical duty or a codification of a preexisting duty. Some
commentators do not view this rule as “new,” stating that technological
competence has always been inherent in competent representation. 40 In their
view, Comment 8 just made that point as clear as possible. 41 The ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20 stated that the amendment “does not impose
any new obligations on lawyers” and instead was a “reminder” of a
preexisting ethical obligation. 42 Maybe the best description of the impetus
behind this rule-change comes from Professor James Moliterno, who wrote,
“[t]he proposed changes do not change. They articulate what change
technology has already made.” 43 But even if the rule change was a mere
“reminder,” rule updates and change do not just happen without a reason. 44
In 2012, the ABA felt compelled to speak in formal language about the

37 Browning, supra note 35, at 258 (quoting Introduction and Overview, 2012 A.B.A. COMM’N ON
ETHICS
20/20
REP.
16,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120508_ethics_20_20_fina
l_hod_introdution_and_overview_report.authcheckdam.pdf).
38 See id. (“[The ABA’s] new words mandate that competency mean more than just keeping up with
statutory developments or common law changes in one’s particular field, but also having sufficient
familiarity with and proficiency in technology that may affect both the substantive area of practice itself
and how the lawyer delivers these services.”).
39 John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will
Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3060 (2014)
(“Mastery of technology relevant to providing legal services, including machine intelligence, has therefore
become an express duty of a competent lawyer, as well as an essential obligation of the exemplary
lawyer.”).
40 See Sam Glover, You Already Have an Ethical Obligation to Be Technologically Competent,
LAWYERIST.COM
(Aug.
31,
2015),
https://lawyerist.com/86726/already-ethical-obligationtechnologically-competent/.
41 See id. (“The comment did not create the obligation to be technologically competent. It has
always been part and parcel of regular old professional competence.”).
42 Resolution, 2012 A.B.A. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20 REP. TO HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_1
05a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
43 James E. Moliterno, Ethics 20/20 Successfully Achieved Its Mission: It “Protected, Preserved,
and Maintained,” 47 AKRON L. REV. 149, 155 (2014).
44 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
256 (2012) (noting that “a change in the language of a prior statute presumably connotes a change in
meaning”).
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importance of technological competence in the hope that the state bars would
listen.45
The state bars listened. Since 2012, twenty states have adopted an
explicit ethical duty of technological competence, and there has been no
shortage of coverage in legal news of the extinction of the luddite lawyer. 46
Coverage about the new language highlighted technological competence
with respect to electronic discovery, which, according to one influential
jurist,
. . . explicitly recognizes, for the first time, that lawyers must become competent in matters of
technology, which undoubtedly includes knowledge of the impact of technology in electronic
discovery. Lawyers have a responsibility to educate themselves and their clients about the new
and pertinent legal and technical issues that arise in electronic discovery. This is especially
true with respect to an attorney’s duty to assist the client in the process of identifying,
preserving, reviewing, and producing ESI. This includes an obligation to seek, as part of the
lawyer’s due diligence, all relevant information, positive or otherwise, which may relate to the
claims at issue. To do otherwise is an ethical violation. 47

Further support of this notion comes from the CSBA. The bar
association has roundly backed the proposition that a luddite lawyer who fails
to grasp electronic discovery principles has violated the state’s rules of
professional conduct.48 The CSBA examined a case where an attorney’s
inattentiveness and lack of knowledge in electronic discovery caused the

45

The ABA may have even done so because of an international trend. For example, in 2004, the
Canadian Bar Association (“CBA”) created a similar rule:
Competence involves more than an understanding of legal principles; it involves an adequate
knowledge of the practice and procedures by which those principles can be effectively applied.
To accomplish this, the lawyer should keep abreast of developments in all areas in which the
lawyer practices. The lawyer should also develop and maintain a facility with advances in
technology in areas in which the lawyer practices to maintain a level of competence that meets
the standard reasonably expected of lawyers in similar practice circumstances.
CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT ch. II cmt. 4 (2004).
46 The states that had formally adopted Comment 8 to Rule 1.1 as of May 2016 were Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. See Robert Ambrogi, 20 States Have Adopted Ethical Duty of Technology Competence, LAW
SITES BLOG (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2015/03/11-states-have-adopted-ethical-dutyof-technology-competence.html; see also David Horrigan, It’s An Ethical Obligation: You Need to “Get”
Technology, N.J.L.J. (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202742190288/Its-an-EthicalObligation-You-Need-to-Get-Technology?slreturn=20160405220958; James Podgers, You Don’t Need
Perfect Tech Knowhow for Ethics’ Sake—But a Reasonable Grasp Is Essential, ABA J. (Aug. 9, 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/you_dont_need_perfect_tech_knowhow_for_ethics_sake-but_a_reasonable_grasp/; Megan Zavieh, Luddite Lawyers Are Ethical Violations Waiting to Happen,
LAWYERIST.COM (July 10, 2015), https://lawyerist.com/71071/luddite-lawyers-ethical-violationswaiting-happen/.
47 SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A N UTSHELL 327
(2d ed. 2016).
48 See Cal. Bar Op., supra note 26, at 3.
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client harm.49 At the end of the examination, the CSBA noted that the failure
to perform a knowledgeable assessment of electronically-stored information
and potential issues was itself a failure of the duty of competence. 50 In
measuring the import of this failure, the CSBA drew parallels to instances in
which (1) an attorney failed to notify his clients of taxes due; 51 (2) an attorney
failed to take necessary action for clients in bankruptcy; 52 and (3) an attorney
“recklessly” delayed administering an estate, including failing to sell and
distribute property. 53 The CSBA stated plainly that:
Electronic document creation and/or storage, and electronic communications, have become
commonplace in modern life, and discovery of ESI is now a frequent part of almost any
litigated matter. 54

It cannot be understated that the CSBA made knowledge of electronic
discovery a normalized piece of attorney competence, akin to making sure a
client knows that his taxes are due. 55
B.

Extending Beyond the Ethical Rules

The consequence for luddite lawyering can go beyond an ethical
violation. In criminal law, attorneys who failed to utilize available
technology have been found to have provided ineffective assistance, or at
least to have waived key arguments. These examples can include not
introducing social media evidence that was readily available, 56 or not timely
googling prospective jurors. 57 Ineffective assistance of counsel is counsel that
falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness.”58 As practitioners have
noted, “what is ‘reasonable’ in terms of what counsel is expected to know

49

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 4.
51 Id. at 5 (citing In re Respondent G., 2 Cal. St. Bar Ct. Rptr. 175, 179 (Cal. Review Dep’t 1992)).
52 Id. (citing In re Matter of Copren, 4 Cal. St. Bar Ct. Rptr. 861, 864 (Cal. Review Dep’t 2005)).
53 Id. (citing In re Matter of Layton, 2 Cal. St. Bar Ct. Rptr. 366, 377–78 (Cal. Review Dep’t 1993)).
54 See Cal. Bar Op., supra note 26, at 7.
55 Id. at 2–5.
56 See Cannedy v. Adams, No. ED CV 08-1230-CFEE, 2009 WL 3711958, at 28–31 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 4, 2009) (holding that failure to introduce evidence of a profile containing a purported molestation
victim’s recantations was ineffective assistance of counsel), aff’d, 706 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2013);
Agnieszka McPeak, Social Media Snooping and Its Ethical Bounds, 46 ARIZ. ST . L.J. 845, 856–58 (2014)
(suggesting that searching social media is essential for effective representation).
57 See Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W. 3d 551, 558–59 (Mo. 2010) (concluding that failure to
object to juror before trial was waived where juror’s bias was available to attorneys upon an internet
search).
58 Cannedy, 2009 WL 3711958, at *15 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984)).
50
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about e-discovery is rapidly changing, and only in the direction of requiring
greater knowledge.” 59
Can luddite lawyering be malpractice? This idea prompted attorneys
from a large New York firm to write:
Given all of the resources which have been devoted to educating the bar about the need to
preserve electronic information, emails, documents, etc., it is not too hard to imagine a client
claiming that the failure to do so in this day and age amounts to malpractice, even though that
would not have been the case however many years ago. 60

Another commentator agrees that “[t]he possibility of a legal
malpractice claim or bar discipline for incompetence with respect to
technology now poses a real threat.”61
C.

Why Electronic Discovery Is the Flashpoint: Lawyers Are Still Bad at
It

Attorney sanctions occur more often than usual in discovery disputes,
where misconduct can result due to counsel’s inattentiveness to required
responses,62 inability to understand technology, 63 or dishonesty.64 Many of
59 Joel Cohen & James L. Bernard, The ‘Ethic of Getting Up to Speed ‘Technology,’ N.Y.L.J., Dec.
10, 2013.
60 Id.
61 Lanctot, supra note 10, at 83.
62 See Recommind Article, supra note 9 (citing HM Elecs. Inc. v. R.F. Techs., Inc., No. 12cv2884BAS-MDD, 2015 WL 4714908, at *1, 31, 34–35 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015)) (sanctioning a party for
inaccurate and sloppy responses, intentional wrongdoing, and general incompetence, in the form of all
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in seeking discovery, along with an adverse inference based on
unavailable information); see also Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 818 (“In all four cases [studied] in
which the court sanctioned counsel for negligent conduct, counsel was in possession of client materials
but failed to produce them in a timely fashion.” (alteration in original)).
63 See Michael J. Bauer, Fail to Plan, Plan to Pay: Ignorance of the E-Discovery Amendments Can
Be Costly, WATT, TIEDER, HOFFAR & FITZGERALD, L.L.P. 1 (last visited Sept. 10, 2017),
http://www.gcila.org/publications/files/pub_en_141.pdf; Paul Devinski, E-Discovery: Doing It in an
“Ignorant and Indifferent Fashion” May Lead to Sanctions, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Jan. 21,
2010), https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2010/01/ediscovery--doing-it-in-anignorant-and-indiffer.
64 It could be argued that the Qualcomm case, the gold standard of attorney sanctioning cases,
involved inattentiveness, lack of understand of technology, and dishonest behavior. The attorneys in
Qualcomm were ordered to pay $8.5 million for intentionally withholding thousands of documents and
failing to make a reasonable inquiry that would have made such an omission obvious; the attorneys were
also referred to the state bar association for disciplinary action. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,
No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *20 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008). The sanctions were later lifted,
but the legendary story remains. See Ashby Jones, Sanctions Lifted Against Qualcomm Lawyers (After
Damage
Is
Done),
WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Apr.
7,
2010,
9:41
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/07/sanctions-lifted-against-qualcomm-lawyers-after-damage-is-done/.
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these failures by counsel are unintentional and result from a lack of
organization or understanding of the complicated discovery process. 65
Sanctions against counsel for electronic discovery violations steadily
increased as information in discovery became more electronic, and technical
knowledge became less of a specialty and more of a requirement in
litigation.66 Electronic discovery sanctions against litigants are common, and
sanctions against counsel for electronic discovery violations are “rare but . .
. increasing.”67 These sanctions are often monetary, but also can include
nonmonetary sanctions, such as ordering counsel to develop a discovery
protocol and participate in education, 68 ordering counsel to read certain
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 and ordering counsel to submit an
affidavit certifying compliance of cooperation efforts. 70
Counsel sanctions in discovery disputes are correctional in nature,
hoping to make an example of bad behavior to the rest of the bar. 71
Nonmonetary sanctions in particular are as much a message to potential
future transgressors as they are punishment to the specific transgressor.
Indeed, “[a]n emerging goal in counsel sanctions in the recent electronic
discovery cases, when they do occur, is to induce counsel to improve
discovery behavior either in the case at hand or, by example, in future
litigation.”72 As one retired judge put it, “[a]s this response suggests, it is a
consistent complaint of the bar that judges do not sanction lawyers’
misbehavior in the discovery process.”73

65

Thomas Y. Allman, Achieving an Appropriate Balance: The Use of Counsel Sanctions in
Connection with the Resolution of E-Discovery Misconduct, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2009, at 1, 30
(noting that the root cause of electronic discovery disputes “is often a lack of dedicated client resources
coupled with inadequate internal coordination in the face of overwhelming complexity”).
66 See Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 816 (“[C]ounsel sanctions for e-discovery have steadily
increased since 2004.”).
67 Id. at 815–17 n.119 (listing cases awarding sanctions in e-discovery cases).
68 See id. at 823 n.150 (citing Qualcomm Inc., 2008 WL 66932, at *18–19).
69 See id. (citing Auto. Inspection Servs., Inc. v. Flint Auto Auction, Inc., No. 06-15100, 2007 WL
3333016, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2007)).
70 See id. (first citing Bd. of Regents v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 WL 3342423, at *7
(D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007); then citing Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 559
(N.D. Cal. 1987)).
71 See Janet Eve Josselyn, The Song of the Sirens—Sanctioning Lawyers Under 28 U.S.C. 1927, 31
B.C. L. REV. 477, 477 (1990) (“Attorneys who abuse the litigation process contribute to rising litigation
costs. In an attempt to bring the costs home to those who create them, courts have become more willing
to impose sanctions on attorneys who abuse the judicial process.” (footnotes omitted).
72 Allman, supra note 65, at 3.
73 3rd Annual Federal Judges Survey, supra note 16, at 14 (providing expert commentary from
retired Judge John Facciola).
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Revised Rule 1 and Its New(ish) Obligation to Attorneys

So, luddite lawyers must learn to use technology or risk ethical
violations, malpractice, and discovery sanctions based on their ignorance. As
if luddite lawyers do not have enough problems, a recent change to the very
beginning of the Federal Rules is further evidence of an anti-luddite trend
and, as this Article suggests, is potentially the source of a rule-based duty of
technological competence. Rule 1 of the FRCP has been cited as the “master
rule.” 74 The rule affects how all others should be applied, in order that the
resolution of disputes is “just, speedy, and inexpensive.” 75 Some have called
Rule 1 a value or mission statement. 76 It, as well as the rest of the Federal
Rules, must be construed “liberally.”77 As such, Rule 1 has been cited
somewhat inconsistently by courts as a guide to construction, 78 and even as a
catch-all exception to following other Rules. 79 As one commentator
concluded:

74 Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
287, 288 (2010).
75 Id. at n.7 (“The most important rule of all is the last sentence of [Rule] 1 . . . [that litigation is to
be] ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive.’ . . . It is this command that gives all the other rules life and meaning
and timbre in the realist world of the trial court.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Paris Air Crash of
Mar. 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1975))).
76 Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1325 (1995) (“For over fifty years, Rule 1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure has attempted to guide civil litigation in the United States district courts by
associating the Rules with a set of overarching values. Since 1938, the second sentence of Rule 1 has
mandated that courts construe the Rules to ‘secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action?’ Despite the longevity of Rule 1, we have yet to examine closely the problems presented by
a rule that attempts to direct through the recitation of process values.” (footnotes omitted)).
77 Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 7 (quoting Plant Econ., Inc. v. Mirror Insulation Co., 308 F.2d
275, 278 (3d Cir. 1962)).
78 See Johnston, supra note 76, at 1349 (“Not only did the trinity lead the early district courts to pay
careful attention to the language in the Rules, it also provided a tool for interpreting the Rules. The trinity
literally provided a rule of construction applicable to the remaining rules of civil procedure.”); id. at 1373–
75 (“For example, district courts continue to present the Rule 1 trinity [Rule 1’s edict that proceedings be
“just, speedy, and inexpensive”] in the form of unexplained invocations and benedictions. Some courts
continue to include the trinity in separate but unconnected paragraphs. District courts also continue to use
the trinity as a rule for construing the language of other Rules. In particular, district courts still assume
that the trinity mandates liberal interpretations of the Rules to facilitate resolutions on the merits.”
(footnotes omitted)).
79 See id. at 1385 (“Perhaps the most interesting use of the trinity arises when courts view it as
authorization to treat lightly or even supersede applicable language in other Rules. In doing so, some
district courts have recognized that the trinity can be used to subvert the purposes of other Rules.”). For
example, one court cited Rule 1 in a case in which a court created an “early screening” system of prisoner
rights cases based on a “common pattern of jurisdictional, substantive, procedural and pragmatic issues”
in those cases. Id. at 1388 (citing Feliciano v. Dubois, 846 F. Supp. 1033, 1038 (D. Mass. 1994).
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[D]istrict courts currently use the Rule 1 trinity to flavor a broad variety of procedural stews.
Some courts use the trinity [Rule 1’s edit that litigation be “just, speedy, and inexpensive”] to
foster liberal interpretations requiring only substantial compliance with the Rules; others use
the trinity to justify interpretations that tend to impede adjudication on the merits. Some courts
employ the trinity to define their limits by the language of the Rules; others employ it to escape
or exceed the limits sets by the Rules’ language. Some courts utilize the trinity without
reference to precedent; others, to avoid troubling precedent. Finally, some courts invoke the
trinity without attempting to explain its meaning or effect; others cite the trinity while
admitting the difficulty of explaining how its parts can be fit together. In short, rather than a
simple rule of construction, the federal courts seem to have transformed the trinity into a rule
of heightened discretion. 80

Rule 1 has long been considered a “preamble” to the rules and neglected
by judges and academics.81 However, a dramatic increase in citations to Rule
1 in recent years indicates it is experiencing something of a “revival.” 82 A
survey of reported opinions on attorney misconduct noted that “[o]ne theme
that runs consistently through the opinions is that judges believe and
communicate, either implicitly or explicitly, that an attorney’s primary
responsibility is to the proper functioning of the system.” 83 In fact, Rule 1
now imposes an affirmative obligation on participants in litigation. As part
of recent rule changes that took place in 2015, Rule 1 now mandates that the
Rules “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.” 84 The italicized text in the preceding sentence is new,
as a part of the changes to discovery rules enacted in 2015.85 The increased
onus on the court and the parties to secure just, speedy, and inexpensive
determinations of actions and proceedings is meant to be a “game changer.” 86
It places all participants in litigation on equal footing to accomplish a task

80

Id. at 1392 (footnotes omitted).
Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 158, 159 n.182 (2015) (“Only
a smattering of scholarly articles squarely address Rule 1 . . . .”).
82 Bone, supra note 74, at 299.
83 Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View
from the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1440 (2004).
84 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).
85 Chief Justice Roberts, 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, S UPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 4 (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015yearendreport.pdf (“Many rules amendments are modest and technical, even persnickety, but the 2015
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are different. Those amendments are the product of
five years of intense study, debate, and drafting to address the most serious impediments to just, speedy,
and efficient resolution of civil disputes.”).
86 Id. at 6 (“The [italicized] words make express the obligation of judges and lawyers to work
cooperatively in controlling the expense and time demands of litigation—an obligation given effect in the
amendments that follow. The new passage highlights the point that lawyers—though representing adverse
parties—have an affirmative duty to work together, and with the court, to achieve prompt and efficient
resolutions of disputes.”).
81
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that commentators describe as both vastly important and inherently
paradoxical.87
Rule 1’s obligation may be difficult for attorneys to meet because many
feel that litigation does not live up to its promise of “just, speedy, and
inexpensive” determinations. 88 The perception is that Rule 1’s goals are not
met in litigation, 89 and especially not in the litigation discovery phase. 90
Further, because the challenge of managing such an enormous volume of
information often creates more work than a case is worth, “the typical case
presents increasing difficulty in meeting the aspirational goals of Rule 1 with
respect to electronic discovery.”91 Increased direct judicial involvement in
managing cases, to the extent practicable, is widely seen as the best way to
counter this difficulty. 92
With respect to the information explosion and discovery, it has been
noted that the “‘[c]ost of discovery is a pertinent and appropriate
consideration’” in the analysis of litigation pursuant to Rule 1’s edict.93 The
Supreme Court has cited Rule 1 to reflect its desire to nationally reduce cost
87

See Bone, supra note 74, at 288 (describing widespread calls for litigation to be more fair and
less expensive, but then aptly describing the phrase “just, speedy, and inexpensive” to present three
adjectives at odds with each other and other values, noting that it is unrealistic to assume that these
objectives can be achieved “without tradeoffs or conflicts and without sacrificing substantive justice for
speedier resolution or lower costs”).
88 See Harold Hongju Koh, “The Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action?”,
162 U. P A. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (2014) (“Is today’s civil process just? Sometimes no. Is it speedy?
Relatively. Inexpensive? Not really. Are there determinations of every action? Terminations, yes, but not
necessarily ‘determinations.’”).
89 See Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 2 (“In reality, few parties to litigation in federal court receive
the prompt and economical resolution that FRCP 1 seems to promise.”); see also Waxse, supra note 12,
at 111 (“As most parties and counsel agree, litigation today is a method of resolving disputes that is too
costly and time consuming for most parties involved. I see that on a day-to-day basis in my case
management work as a Federal Magistrate Judge.”).
90 See id. (“Nowhere is this [excess time and cost] more evident than in cases involving the
discovery of large volumes of electronically stored information.”).
91 Roe Frazer & Marc Jenkins, The Future of eDiscovery in Tennessee, 1 BELMONT L. REV. 181,
190 (2014) (“For a litigator seeking to find the key documents that will assist with a case, the challenge
is to convert raw data into real knowledge.”); see also Koh, supra note 88, at 1540 (“[T]he Federal Rules
have partially achieved—but only partially—their own self-stated goal of the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action. That this goal remains partly unrealized is no one’s fault. In
good measure, the Rules simply have not evolved fast enough to keep up with grand social change:
stunning revolutions in technology, communication, globalization, and human rights.”).
92 See John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 D UKE L. J. 537, 542 (2010) (“One area of
substantial agreement [during a conference of judges, practitioners, and academics on Rule 1 and
proportional discovery] was the need for active judicial management of litigation. The litigants and parties
welcomed this involvement as a way of assuring that proceedings are conducted in such a way that their
costs are proportionate to the stakes of the litigation.”); Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer,
Managing Toward the Goals of Rule 1, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010).
93 Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 5 (alteration in original) (quoting Florida ex rel. Butterworth v.
Indus. Chems., Inc., 145 F.R.D. 585, 589 (N.D. Fla. 1991)).
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in litigation.94 One commentator noted that “because of its indeterminacy,
particularly in the context of its recently increased association with
efficiency, Rule 1 provides an internal, text-based anchor for the Roberts
Court’s managerial Rules interpretation. If the Court wishes to focus on
systemic efficiency, Rule 1’s ‘speedy and efficient’ language provides
support for that.”95
The key takeaway from revised Rule 1 is that, if it was not obvious
before,96 counsel, parties, and judges must work together to provide a
smoother, cheaper legal system, primarily in light of Big Data’s large cost. 97
This Article addresses the question that arises when any action is prescribed
by law or rule: “or what?” How does one violate this rule and what happens
to the transgressor?
The drafters of the revised rule did not provide a clear answer. In fact,
the 2015 Committee Notes on Rule 1 stated that “[t]his amendment does not
create a new or independent source of sanctions” and “[n]either does it
abridge the scope of any other of these rules.” 98 This curious addition came
as a result of anticipated confusion that the rule would “serve as a basis for
sanctions for a failure to cooperate.” 99 While the drafters’ reticence at giving
94 Id. at 6 (“The Supreme Court has observed that Rule 1 reflects a ‘national policy . . . to minimize
the costs of litigation.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227,
234 (1964))); see also Johnston, supra note 76, at 1328–29 (noting that the goal of Rule 1 was “reducing
excessive delays and expense in civil litigation; curtailing and eliminating frivolous claims and defenses;
reducing burdens on litigants; and preserving scarce judicial resources”).
95 Porter, supra note 81, at 163.
96 Some commentators argued that it was fairly obvious already that practitioners needed to help
cases be administered per Rule 1’s directives. See, e.g., Hon. Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M.
Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 19, 53–54 (2015) (encouraging practitioners to aid judges in administering cases
under Rule 1).
97 See Roberts, supra note 85, at 9–10 (“The 2015 civil rules amendments are a major stride toward
a better federal court system. But they will achieve the goal of Rule 1—‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding’—only if the entire legal community, including the bench,
bar, and legal academy, step up to the challenge of making real change. . . . It will also require a genuine
commitment, by judges and lawyers alike, to ensure that our legal culture reflects the values we all
ultimately share.”); see, e.g., Waxse, supra note 12, at 111–12 (describing the District of Kansas’s revised
Guidelines for Cases Involving ESI as a direct response to, inter alia, “problems caused by lack of lawyer
technical competence”). These Guidelines explicitly state that their purpose is “to facilitate the just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of disputes involving ESI, and to promote, whenever possible, the
resolution of disputes regarding the discovery of ESI without Court intervention.” Id. at 117 (emphasis
added).
98 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
99 Thomas Y. Allman, The 2015 Civil Rules Package as Transmitted to Congress, 16 SEDONA
CONF. J. 1, 8–9 (2015) (footnote omitted); Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Minutes, U.S. Courts 5
(May 1, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/committee-rulespractice-and-procedure-may-2014 (“The added language would make it clear that the change was not
intended to create a new source for sanctions motions.”); see also Memorandum from Judge David G.
Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Proc., to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Advisory
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overzealous litigators an independent option to bring a sanctions motion is
understandable, this language creates an issue with the core idea that parties
must obey Rule 1’s edicts. At first blush, it seems as if the drafters of the
revised rule have created an exception that will swallow it. After all, if Rule
1 charges parties to ensure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
disputes, but no sanctions can ensue from a failure to do so, how is this charge
to be enforced? Focusing on the language that the Rule cannot be a “new or
independent” source of sanctions may be helpful. The change in Rule 1 may
not be the direct source of sanctions—that job would fall to existing
sanctioning avenues described herein—but those avenues would be justified
by a party’s failure to meet its obligations under Rule 1. Further, sanctions
for luddite attorneys do not so much result from a failure to cooperate but
from a failure to meaningfully participate in the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of disputes.
Indeed, commentators have already noticed a relationship between the
ethical duty a lawyer has to keep abreast of technology and the change in the
Federal Rules requiring lawyers to speed litigation along. These
commentators have observed that “[a] lawyer’s duty of competence under
Model Rule 1.1 is necessarily implicated by the lawyer’s duties under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.”100 Put succinctly, “[t]o ensure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action required by Rule 1, an
attorney must provide competent representation, which requires a continuous
assessment of the risks and benefits of technology.” 101
Increasingly competent judges observe the truth of commentators’
findings. Indeed, Judge Facciola, commenting on the increases in
technological competency among members of the bench, noted that “counsel
is now challenged to have the technological competence that is at least equal
to the judges’ competency. . . . A technologically competent judge is going
to insist that counsel have, at least, technological competence equal to their
own.”102
What if a lawyer fails to provide competent representation with respect
to keeping current in technology in civil discovery? Is such conduct
sanctionable? Possibly yes. The next Part will discuss the basis for such
sanctions.
Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. B-13 (June 14, 2014) (“Another [concern] was that this change may
invite ill-founded attempts to seek sanctions for violating a duty to cooperate.”).
100 This idea first surfaced in a brief article in March 2016. See Christopher Skinner & Stephanie
McCoy Loquvam, How Amended Civil Rule 1 Changes the Landscape of Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(Mar.
31,
2016),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/youngadvocate/articles/spring2016-0316-howamended-civil-rule-1-changes-landscape-lawyers-ethical-obligations.html (“[C]ourts are not going to
sympathize with attorneys or clients who do not stay abreast of advances in technology.”).
101 Id.
102 3rdAnnual Federal Judges Survey, supra note 16, at 13 (quoting Judge Facciola as an expert
commentator).
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HOW COURTS CAN SANCTION LUDDITES BY USING (IN PART) RULE 1

Recently, courts have shown a general tendency to chastise luddite
attorneys. For example, Judges have exhibited public frustration and
chastised attorneys for not having an operational email account, 103 not
Googling an obvious internet scam involving a client and unknowingly
helping the client spread that scam, 104 and not using an electronic search for
an absent party. 105 Can leveraging Rule 1 justify sanctions for such conduct?
A.

Background of Courts’ Sanctioning Power Over Attorneys

To lay the groundwork for sanctioning an attorney whose conduct
frustrates Model Rule 1.1 and FRCP Rule 1, because Rule 1 is not a source
of sanction in itself, one must briefly consider the source of civil sanctions
and how they apply to attorneys. This is an area of law that happens “on the
ground” in the trial courts. 106 That being said, when sanctions do come down,
they usually stick. Appellate courts are often deferential to trial courts when
examining sanctions. 107 This propensity for sanctions to survive appeal places
great responsibility on trial courts, and repeat litigants may see a variety of
consequences for the same behavior.108
103 See Nicole Black, Legal Scoop: S.C. Lawyers Required to Maintain Email Address, D AILY REC.
(Oct. 28, 2013), http://nydailyrecord.com/2013/10/28/legal-loop-s-c-lawyers-required-to-maintainemail-address.
104 See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright, 840 N.W.2d 295, 301 (Iowa 2013).
105 See, e.g., Dubois v. Butler, 901 So.2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (criticizing an
attorney who only checked directory assistance to find and serve defendant was employing a method that
was the modern equivalent of “the horse and buggy and the eight track stereo”); Munster v. Groce, 829
N.E.2d 52, 61 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ( “[The court] discovered, upon entering ‘Joe Groce Indiana’ into
the Google search engine, an address for Groce that differed from either address used in this case, as well
as an apparent obituary for Groce’s mother that listed numerous surviving relatives who might have
known his whereabouts.”).
106 Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 817 (“[C]ase law involving counsel e-discovery sanctions is
predominantly being developed at the trial court level by magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges, and
district court judges.”).
107 Allman, supra note 65, at 21 (“U.S. Courts of Appeals are quite reluctant to second guess lower
courts, given their ‘intimate familiarity with the details of the discovery dispute’ and the risk of
undermining their authority” (quoting In re Fannie Mac Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 822 (D.C. Cir. 2009)));
see also Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 797–98 (“Appellate review of e-discovery sanction cases has
been limited, perhaps because many cases settle or are otherwise not appealed.”).
108 See Jeff Lilly & Fred Raschke, The Growing Problem of Spoliation Sanctions, INSIDE COUNSEL
MAG. (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/03/20/the-growing-problem-of-spoliationsanctions (“Today, the spoliation doctrine is so problematic, inconsistently applied and often times a
‘gotcha’ game.”). This inconsistency was a major driver of the revisions to Rule 37, creating a standard
for spoliation sanctions and resolving a circuit split. See, e.g., Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 99,
at app’x. B-17 (“A primary purpose of [revised Rule 37] is to eliminate the circuit split on when a court
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Explicit Powers

A court can sanction attorneys for conduct in litigation through several
rules.109 Most commonly, various sections of Rule 37 permit sanctions
against lawyers and law firms for failing to participate in good faith
discovery.110 Specifically, Rule 37(a)(5)(A) enables sanctions for dilatory
conduct that results in a successful motion to compel. 111 Also, Rule
37(b)(2)(C) enables sanctions for disobeying a discovery order, 112 and Rule
37(d)(3) enables sanctions for failure to attend depositions, serve answers, or
respond to discovery. 113 Essentially, “Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that counsel advising clients regarding discovery matters
must undertake the necessary efforts needed to achieve adequate results.” 114
“Rule 37 is the most frequently used authority” to sanction counsel for ediscovery violations.115
In addition to Rule 37 sanctions, sanctions can emanate from a lawyer’s
failure to make a “reasonable inquiry” required by Rule 26(g) before signing
a discovery disclosure, request, or response.116 Courts have sanctioned
attorneys under Rule 26(g) for signing discovery filings that make an
insufficient inquiry into the accuracy of the contents or the purpose behind
the filing.117
Also, lawyers may run afoul of a duty not to create additional litigation,
including discovery disputes. Courts have relied on the statutory authority of
28 U.S.C. § 1927, which prohibits behavior by attorneys that “unreasonably
and vexatiously” multiplies proceedings. 118 Such attorneys “may be required
by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 119 Sanctions are rare
under this statute because of a circuit split with respect to the applicable

may give an adverse inference jury instruction for the loss of ESI.”). This is so for attorney sanctions as
well. See McMorrow, supra note 83, at 1448–49 (noting deference by appellate courts to trial courts in
reviewing sanctions for attorney misconduct).
109 Allman, supra note 65, at 4–5.
110 Id. at 17 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A), 37(b)(2)(C), 37(d)(3)).
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A).
112 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
113 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3).
114 Allman, supra note 65, at 5.
115 Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 817.
116 FED. R. CIV. P 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment, subdiv. (g); Allman, supra note
65, at 17.
117 See Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 817 (citing Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No.
05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *13 n.9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008)).
118 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012); see In re Veg Liquidation, Inc., 516 B.R. 545, 549 n.2 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 2014).
119 28 U.S.C. § 1927; see Josselyn, supra note 71, at 478–79.
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standard, negligence or bad faith, 120 and a general consensus, notwithstanding
that split, that the statutory language requires a high degree of culpable
conduct.121
2.

Implicit Powers

A court also has the inherent power to sanction litigation misconduct
that does not fit neatly into a rule or statutory mechanism for sanctions. 122 In
other words, “one of the most common and important roles of inherent
powers is to allow courts to craft flexible sticks to sanction contumacious
parties.” 123 This power grows out of a court’s ability to, in essence, manage
its own affairs without the text of any one rule explicitly binding it. 124
Sanctioning is one of many such powers. 125 Sanctions under this power can
take the same forms as they would under federal statues and rules. 126

120

See In re Veg Liquidation, 516 B.R. at 549 n.2 (listing cases and enumerating circuit split, noting
uncertainty even within circuits); Josselyn, supra note 71, at 478–79 (describing circuit split over standard,
with some requiring merely negligent behavior, and others requiring bad faith).
121 Allman, supra note 65, at 18 (“[28 U.S.C. § 1927] requires a showing of bad faith conduct or
conduct amounting to bad faith, judged objectively, or ‘recklessness’ (but not mere ‘negligence’) coupled
with an improper purpose. A finding of liability [also] requires a high degree of specificity . . . .”).
122 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–45 (1991) (stating that, among other things,
courts have the power to “impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, and submission to their
lawful mandates”; to “punish for contempts”; and to “fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which
abuses the judicial process”); Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes On—Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs
Beware: Rule 11 Vis-À-Vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s Inherent Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645,
653 (2004) (“The federal district court’s sanctioning power . . . is not limited to what is enumerated in
statutes or in the rules of civil procedure.”); Jennifer M. Treece, Finding Limitations on the Federal
Courts’ Inherent Power to Sanction: Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 27 TULSA L.J. 717, 727 (1992) (“The
purpose of inherent power sanctions is to penalize bad faith litigation abuses.”).
123 Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U. ANN.
S URV. AM. L. 37, 47 (2008).
124 Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962) (“[Power is governed] not by rule or statute
but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs . . . .”). This is an
oversimplification of the source of the Court’s inherent power, to be sure. See Benjamin H. Barton, An
Article I Theory of the Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 31 (2011).
125 See Barton, supra note 124, at 2 n.1 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43–45) (“Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc. offers a more recent and complete list, which includes the powers to ‘impose silence, respect,
and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates’; to ‘control admission to its bar
and to discipline attorneys’; to ‘punish for contempts’; to ‘vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud
has been perpetrated upon the court’; to ‘dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens’; to ‘act
sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute’; and to ‘fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct
which abuses the judicial process.’”).
126 See Thomas E. Baker, The Inherent Power to Impose Sanctions: How a Federal Judge Is Like an
800-Pound Gorilla, 14 REV. LITIG. 195, 200 (1994) (surveying inherent power and concluding that
“[p]resumably, any sanction contemplated under federal statutes and rules can be imposed incident to the
inherent power as well”).
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As one might guess from its very nature, the court’s inherent power to
sanction is difficult to fully articulate and use consistently. The Supreme
Court described this power in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.127 as “safely” used
when “neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task,” 128 but
recommended that courts “ordinarily should” use the Civil Rules as a basis
for sanctioning. 129 In that sense, inherent powers are perhaps a catchall—“a
flexible tool that enables courts to respond to the changing realities of
litigation without requiring a prolix code of procedure.”130 Put another way,
“for cases in which some of the behavior would not be reached by the existing
statutes and rules, a court could use its inherent powers to reach all of the
behavior at once.”131 A court’s inherent powers are fluid, and exist to help the
court manage its schedule and keep cases moving speedily, similar to the
edict in Rule 1. 132
That attorneys, as officers of the court, knowingly submit themselves to
the court’s authority with respect to decorum and procedure makes attorneys
particularly susceptible to sanctions under the court’s inherent power. As one
commentator observed, “[t]he notion of ‘supervisory powers’—which
functions as a special form or subset of inherent powers—appears to give
courts greater latitude in imposing sanctions on attorneys who appear before
the court.” 133 Courts “are willing to act sua sponte, identifying attorney
behavior that may have an adverse effect on the proceedings.” 134
These powers can be robust and are nearly entirely discretionary. 135 This
is a power that the Supreme Court has specifically stated courts should use

127

501 U.S. 32 (1991).
Id. at 33.
129 Id. at 33. Professor Barton notes, however, that “[t]he Court is hardly crystal clear on this point;
it also states that a federal court is not ‘forbidden to sanction bad-faith conduct by means of the inherent
power simply because that conduct could also be sanctioned under the statute or the Rules[,]’ assuming
the court follows the other due process and factual requirements.” Barton, supra note 124, at 55 (alteration
in original) (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50).
130 Anclien, supra note 123, at 49.
131 Barton, supra note 124, at 56.
132 Joseph J. Janatka, Note, The Inherent Power: An Obscure Doctrine Confronts Due Process, 65
WASH. U. L.Q. 429, 431 (1987) (“Speedy trials aid the administration of justice. Under the inherent
powers doctrine courts may promulgate rules and procedures to effectuate speedy trials.”); see also
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (“[Federal courts’ implied] powers are ‘governed not by rule or statute but by
the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.’” (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962))).
133 Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court
Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 20 (2005).
134 McMorrow et al., supra note 83, at 1442 (alterations in original); see also Link,370 U.S. at 633
(holding that repeated delays and absenteeism warranted sanction by inherent power).
135 See Treece, supra note 122, at 726 (“Federal courts may act solely at their own discretion to
determine the need for and amount of sanctions under the theory of inherent power.”).
128
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sparingly given its potential for misuse. 136 Courts primarily use this power to
address particularly dilatory, creative, or egregious bad faith conduct in
litigation.137
Courts can combine inherent powers with existing rules to craft
sanctions.138 Courts have done just that. 139 Appellate courts, however,
strongly disfavor the “lazy” approach of using inherent power to sanction a
party where a power prescribed by rule will suffice. 140 In fact, the recent 2015
FRCP explicitly disfavor the use of inherent power sanctions for spoliation. 141
Inherent powers are important to consider in the context of this Article
because Rule 1, in particular, has been cited as a rule that “bridges the gap”
between expressly stated court power and implicit court power. 142 Some
commentators have even suggested revising Rule 1 to make that bridge
clear.143
136

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (“Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised
with restraint and discretion.”); see also Anclien, supra note 123, at 49–51 (outlining the lack of clarity
in consensus for the use of inherent powers); Treece, supra note 122, at 729 (“The inherent power should
be exercised in narrowly defined circumstances, not only to prevent judicial abuse, but also to prevent
subversion of the Federal Rules . . . Use of the inherent power is acceptable where no rules are applicable
to the conduct, but the Federal Rules will not survive if courts may choose to ignore the restraints of
specific rules, relying instead on the ambiguous inherent powers.”).
137 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43–45; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765–66 (1980).
However, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Chambers suggested that “bad faith is not, and should not be, required
for the imposition of inherent power sanctions.” Treece, supra note 122, at 726. Treece’s exhaustive article
also lists cases that suggest that only an inference of bad faith will be sufficient for sanctions. See id. at
726 n.81.
138 See, e.g., David A. Rammelt, Note, “Inherent Power” and Rule 16: How Far Can a Federal
Court Push the Litigant Toward Settlement?, 65 IND. L.J. 965, 982 n.90 (1990) (“[T]he Rules are
frequently combined with the inherent power (or ‘supervisory power’) doctrine.”); id. at 982 n.95 (“When
combined with the speed and efficiency mandate of Rule 1, Rule 16 logically invests in the trial judge the
ability to participate in pretrial to whatever degree the judge feels necessary to speed the lawsuit to its
conclusion.”).
139 See Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime, 87 D ENV. U. L. REV.
311, 313–15 (2010) (noting that inherent power is often used).
140 Anclien, supra note 123, at 39–40 n.9 (citing, inter alia, John Papachristos, Inherent Power
Found, Rule 11 Lost: Taking a Shortcut to Impose Sanctions in Chambers v. NASCO, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
1225, 1265 (1993)) (“[W]here codified sanction provisions provide an adequate means by which to
regulate conduct, authority to act under the guise of inherent power is not only unnecessary, but
improper.”).
141 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment (“New Rule 37(e) replaces
the 2006 rule. It authorizes and specifies measures a court may employ if information that should have
been preserved is lost, and specifies the findings necessary to justify these measures. It therefore forecloses
reliance on inherent authority or state law to determine when certain measures should be used.”).
142 Jordan, supra note 139, at 323 (noting that “courts routinely cite to [Rule 1] as an interpretive
aid” in fashioning the use of inherent power).
143 See id. (“Rule 1 might easily be amended to specify that where rules are present, they are intended
to define the permissible scope of behavior by litigants and judges, and are subject to supplementation
only where explicitly provided for.”). Indeed, it may be prudent for a newly revised Rule 1 to affirmatively
provide a new and independent source of sanctions.
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Judicial Creativity

Sanctions under the rules and inherent power can affect client or counsel
and can take myriad forms. 144 Even the occasionally rigid civil rules “place
virtually no limits on judicial creativity.” 145 One commentator assembled an
impressive list of varied inherent power sanctions, including “fines, award of
attorneys’ fees and costs, disqualification, suspension or disbarment of
counsel, dismissal of an action, preclusion of claims and defenses, and
enjoining litigants from future access to the courts.” 146
Like party sanctions for discovery violations, counsel sanctions are
often monetary, and most are an award of the other side’s fees and costs. 147
Perhaps most noteworthy for the purposes of this Article, judges can issue an
informal sanction to attorneys that serves as a message to the bar. 148 These
sanctions generally “include a court’s decision to issue an opinion, naming
the recalcitrant attorney, outlining his or her misdeeds in detail, and
describing the court's disappointment and outrage.” 149 Informal sanctions
“combine the power of the written word with the importance of an attorney’s
reputation to impress upon an attorney (and the bar) the gravity of the
conduct.” 150 For example, a judge can issue a sanction requiring that counsel
submit an affidavit to the court showing a change in behavior from previous
bad behavior. 151 Professor Thomas Allman describes even more creative
examples, such as:
In St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Financial Corp., counsel [was] ordered to “write
an article explaining why it [was] improper” to assert certain unfounded objections. Other
courts have published the names of counsel in opinions to create a “permanent record”
available to legal researchers. The magistrate judge in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.
required retained and in-house counsel to meet under court auspices to “identify the failures in
the case management and discovery protocol utilized by Qualcomm and its . . . attorneys [so
as to] prevent such failures in the future . . . .” This effort was intended to “establish a baseline
for other cases. . . . [and perhaps] establish a turning point in what the Court perceives as a

144

Allman, supra note 65, at 18.
Id. at 22 (quoting Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 394 (1st Cir. 1990)) (“For
example, while Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lists some types of sanctions for
violating an order to provide discovery, the listing ‘is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, and “the
court may impose [more than one of the enumerated sanctions] at the same time.”’” (footnotes omitted)).
However, there are some limitations, such as Rule 37 (a)(5) and (b)(2)(C) and Rule 26(g)(3)’s requirement
of a monetary sanction absent special circumstances making a monetary sanction unjust. Id.
146 Treece, supra note 122, at 727–28.
147 Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 823.
148 McMorrow et al., supra note 83, at 1453–54.
149 Id. at 1453.
150 Id.
151 See Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 850 n.150 (citing various cases in which the court did so).
145
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decline in and deterioration of civility, professionalism and ethical conduct in the litigation
arena.”152

Judges have a wide berth of creative options to fashion or combine
sanctions. Rule 1 can focus these options.
B.

The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prohibit Rule 1 as a Source for
Sanctions

It should be noted at this point that another potential pitfall for Rule 1
sanctions comes from the Rules Enabling Act. This act was passed by
Congress in the 1930s, giving the Supreme Court “the power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure,” including, of course, the FRCP. 153
Specifically problematic for a creative judge’s leveraging of Rule 1 for
sanctions, the Rules Enabling Act states that such ability to create rules of
practice and procedure “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.” 154 One could argue that a judge cannot use a federal procedural rule to
sanction a litigant and that such sanctions would clearly impact a litigant’s
substantive right. 155
In their leading article on the subject, Professor Martin Redish and
federal clerk Dennis Murashko harmonize the tension between procedure and
substance in the Rules Enabling Act by arguing that it allows for rules of
procedure that affect substantive rights if that effect on a substantive right is
“incidental,” which they describe as either unintended or necessary. 156 The
authors cite Rule 37, mandating compliance with discovery orders, as an
example of a procedural rule giving rise to sanctions up to and including
default or dismissal. 157 They conclude that Rule 37 is a permissible rule under
the Rules Enabling Act because “the primary goal of [Rule 37] is not to
provide a substantive basis on which to resolve a suit. Rather, the primary
goal is procedural—ensuring litigants comply with discovery orders—
because discovery is deemed essential to the fair and accurate performance
of the truth-finding function.” 158 They state that “[t]he rule, then, functions
very much like a substantive club that judges can wave above litigants’ heads
152

Allman, supra note 65, at 24 (alterations in original).
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”).
154 Id. § 2072(b).
155 See Martin Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive
Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 27–29 (2008), for a thoughtful
discussion of the Rules Enabling Act and its effect on sanctions generally.
156 Id. at 29–30.
157 Id. at 30.
158 Id.
153
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to encourage an orderly discovery process.” 159 In other words, the sanction
certainly affects substantive rights, but it is necessary to achieve the
procedural goal of the rule. 160 One can justify sanctions inspired by Rule 1
using the same logic. If anything, the justification is more pure because the
primary goal of Rule 1 is fair procedure. Sanctions inspired by Rule 1 serve
the revised rule’s procedural purpose. Without some sort of lever, there is no
real way for a judge to ensure that the litigants act in a way that promote the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of disputes.
C.

Rule 1 Can Also Be a Source for Sanctions

Notwithstanding language in the Committee Note, judges often use
Rule 1 as a “lever” to justify sanctions under one or more additional federal
rules. 161 And, of course, judges can use Rule 1 liberally. 162 The Supreme
Court opined that “the discovery provisions, like all of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, are subject to the injunction of Rule 1 that they ‘be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” 163
There is a harmony between the discovery rules and Rule 1. The discovery
rules themselves have been “carefully drafted and specific in [their] terms in
order that they ‘secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.’”164 The rapidly changing technology of information
management has made discovery rules in particular quite pliable, and in
fashioning discovery decisions, courts are encouraged to be creative and
flexible with the rules. 165
Through the lens of Rule 1, a court could conceivably use its explicit
and inherent powers to issue an informal sanction to a luddite lawyer for
extending litigation using outdated technology. It can do so even if there is
no explicit spoliation or prejudice to the opposing party, as the traditional
discovery sanction rules require. 166 The sanction would likely be in the form
159

Id. at 40.
Id. at 33.
161 Rammelt, supra note 138, at 982 n.95 (“When combined with the speed and efficiency mandate
of Rule 1, Rule 16 logically invests in the trial judge the ability to participate in pretrial to whatever degree
the judge feels necessary to speed the lawsuit to its conclusion.”).
162 See Bone, supra note 74, at 288 (“The Federal Rules are purposefully designed to delegate broad
discretion to trial judges, and Rule 1 is meant to guide that discretion in socially-productive ways.”).
163 Id. at 297 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979)). The Lando decision also
suggested that Rule 1 could be used with then-Rule 26(b)(1)’s edict that discovery be “‘relevant’” to the
underlying matter. Id. at 297–98.
164 Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 7 (quoting Philpot v. Philco-Ford Corp., 63 F.R.D. 672, 675 (E.D.
Pa. 1974)).
165 See David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 26, 46 (2006).
166 Recent changes to Rule 37 make sanctions less likely under that rule for failure to preserve
information. Specifically, the Rule now requires a showing of “intent to deprive” another party of the
information before a court can levy serious sanctions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(3)(2) (stipulating that the
160
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of an admonishment rather than an outcome-determinative ruling or even
monetary sanctions. Such sanction would be predicated on the luddite party’s
inability to adhere to Rule 1’s edict that all parties assist each other and the
court in administering cases in a “just, speedy, and efficient” manner. 167 This
sanction would fit squarely within the philosophy of a judge’s sanctioning
power, which is derived from efficiency. 168
A notable distinction should be made with respect to using Rule 1 as a
lever to sanction a luddite lawyer versus as a means of cost shifting. 169 It is
certainly plausible (and scholarship exists) to show that a litigant’s failure to
employ technology could result in shifting of excess discovery costs to that
litigant.170 Indeed, there are those who would say that cost shifting is just a
sanction by a different name. 171 It is one thing, however, to reallocate the
costs of a process when a litigant creates waste—for example, requiring a
litigant who could have produced paper documents electronically to pay for
most severe sanctions are reserved for instances where the party acted with intent to deprive another party
of the ESI; courts may “presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party”; “instruct the jury
that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party”; or “dismiss the action or enter
a default judgment.”). While this relaxation of the spoliation sanctions requirement may seem to militate
against attorney sanctions for luddite behavior, this is not so. It instead resolved a massive circuit split
over the propriety of sanctions when documents went missing (or were deleted) through various levels of
negligence or bad faith among counsel and client. Here, a luddite attorney violating Rule 1 may cause
spoliation or may not—but certainly will create waste, delay, and inefficiency. See McMorrow et al.,
supra note 83, at 1445 n.106 (quoting Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 210–11 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)) (“Delays and abuses in discovery are the source of widespread injustice . . .
Trial courts must have the capacity to ensure prompt compliance with their orders, especially when
attorneys attempt to abuse the discovery process to gain a tactical advantage.”). It is these negative aspects
that are the genesis of Rule 1-based sanctions, not spoliation.
167 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
168 Carla R. Pasquale, Note, Scolded: Can an Attorney Appeal a District Court’s Order Finding
Professional Misconduct?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 219, 222 (2008) (“In imposing sanctions, judges are
primarily concerned with the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system as well as the maintenance
of efficient judicial proceedings.”).
169 Though is it interesting to note that in the electronic discovery context, it is not unheard of for a
court to consider a client and its law firm as something like a unified entity, at least as far as cost-shifting
is concerned. In Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, the court considered a classic cost shifting dilemma
in the class action context, where a case pending class certification carries a hefty price tag for one entity,
the defendant. 285 F.R.D. 331, 332 (E.D. Pa. 2012). Often, in such circumstances the defendant seeks
cost shifting so that plaintiffs pay for the discovery they seek. The court ordered such costs to be shifted,
adding that:
[P]laintiffs were represented by a “very successful and well regarded Philadelphia firm …
which has had outstanding successes for many years in prosecuting class actions, winning
hundreds of millions of dollars for their clients, and undoubtedly and deservedly, substantial
fees for themselves. If the … firm believes that this case is meritorious, it has the financial
ability to make the investment in discovery, to the extent the Court finds that cost sharing is
otherwise appropriate.”
SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 284 (quoting Boeynaems, 285 F.R.D. at 335).
170 See, e.g., Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 68–71.
171 Judge Rodriguez & Julia Wommack Mann, Cost Shifting, in ESSENTIALS OF E-DISCOVERY 1, 11
(Judge Rodriguez, ed., 2014).
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the additional time it takes his adversary to conduct a review. 172 It is another
thing to sanction that attorney beyond such compensation under inherent
power in an attempt to deter future conduct. The latter method would fit the
idea of sanctions as a message to the bar that it will not tolerate certain
undesirable behavior.173 It is a wake-up call to the bar to eliminate such
behavior, lest luddite attorneys merely accept cost-shifting as a cost of doing
business.
D.

Sanctions Based on Rule 1 Can Overcome a Presumption Against
Penalizing Lawyers

While a sanction inspired by Rule 1 for luddite lawyers is possible under
a certain reading of the rules, a strong presumption against imposition would
make such sanction rare. This Article does not advocate widespread
sanctioning of attorneys or parties under the discovery rules, the inherent
power, or Rule 1. Despite the attention they get for being “on the rise,” 174
sanctions against parties for conduct in discovery are relatively rare. 175 They
are rarer still against counsel, as “[m]ost courts apply a mild de facto
presumption against sanctioning counsel for discovery misconduct, even
when the client is relatively blameless,” which Professor Allman notes is
based on the principle that clients can choose their counsel and should be
ultimately responsible for the actions of their chosen agent. 176 This principle
is not absolute; one commentator suggests that it is unfair for clients to be
172 See Craig Ball, Lawyer’s Guide to Forms of Production, CRAIGBALL.COM 54 (May 2014),
http://www.craigball.com/Lawyers%20Guide%20to%20Forms%20of%20Production_Ver.20140512_T
X.pdf (interpreting Rules to conclude it “obvious” that “if at the beginning of the litigation the documents
existed as ESI, the producing party cannot unilaterally convert the documents into paper or paper-like
forms (e.g., images) unless the requesting party stipulates to same”) (emphasis deleted).
173 See Rodriguez & Mann, supra note 173, at 11 (“Discovery sanctions serve . . . (2) to serve as a
specific deterrent to achieve compliance with the particular discovery order at issue, and (3) to serve as a
general deterrent in the case at hand and in other litigation, provided that the party against whom sanctions
are imposed was in some sense at fault.”).
174 Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 791; see also Ashby Jones, Study: Lawyer Sanctions over
Electronic Discovery on the Rise, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Jan. 13, 2011, 12:54 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/13/study-lawyer-sanctions-over-electronic-discovery-on-the-rise/.
175 See Henry R. Chalmers, Successful Spoliation Motions Are Rarer than You May Think, LITIG.
NEWS,
Fall
2011,
http://www.agg.com/media/interior/publications/Chalmers-Litigation-NewsSuccessful-Spoliation-Motions-are-Rarer-Than-You-May-Think.pdf (citing Emery G. Lee III, Motions
for Sanctions Based upon Spoliation of Evidence in Civil Cases, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/federaljudicialcenterpdf) (finding that motions for sanctions were only
granted in 27 of 153 cases (18 percent)).
176 Allman, supra note 65, at 25; see also Malloy v. WM Specialty Mortg., LLC, 512 F.3d 23, 27
(1st Cir. 2008) (affirming sanctions on client, despite the fact that counsel could have been sanctioned,
given that the circuit has consistently ignored claims that clients should not be held responsible for
counsel’s mistakes).
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“punished for the sins of their attorneys.” 177 It may be that counsel sanctions
are most appropriate when counsel is more at fault than the client, or where
the client is wronged as much as the court or other parties.178
Professor Allman is staunchly against counsel sanctions, addressing
them as appropriately rare:
Nonetheless, the imposition of sanctions on counsel for discovery misconduct remains a
relatively isolated occurrence and properly so. Attorneys are professionals, whether employed
by one client or serving as independent litigation counsel retained on an ad hoc basis to render
services in specific cases. As such, they can be expected to honor ethical standards of
professionalism and by-and-large must do so to maintain their own standing and reputation. 179

“Counsel only” sanctions are a rarer subset of attorney sanctions. 180
Attorney sanctions are often more indicative of an apportionment of shared
blame rather than a shift of it. That is to say, courts do not often sanction the
attorney alone without the client. 181 If this statistical representation stays
constant, sanctioning a luddite attorney and client will preserve the dynamic
of Professor Allman’s concern that clients are ultimately responsible for their
attorneys and have the choice to change attorneys if they so choose.
Therefore, sanctioning a luddite attorney may be better described as
including an attorney in a sanction against a participant in litigation whose
failure to utilize technology runs afoul of Rule 1, rather than singling out the
advocate as the sole bad actor.
Where severe sanctions are involved, one should examine the propriety
of the sanction to “tip the boat” against a case’s objective merits. It is not
ideal for a sanction to end a case or tip the balance in a case because such

177

Treece, supra note 122, at 730–31 (noting that the court in Chambers never conclusively proved
that the client was the mastermind of any wrongdoing); see also SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at
333–34 (“[A]n attorney will not be held responsible for a client’s misconduct if the lawyer was unaware
of the misconduct, did not assist or participate in it, and moved to correct the deception as soon as she
learned of it. This is exactly what happened in Waste Mgmt. of Washington, Inc. v. Kattler, 776 F.3d 336
(6th Cir. 2015), where the appellate court reversed a contempt finding against a lawyer when a client
disobeyed an order to produce a client’s thumb drive and tablet computer.”)
178 See Allman, supra note 65, at 26 (citing Orgler Homes, Inc. v. Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters,
No. 06 c 50097, 2008 WL 5082979, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2008)) (assigning responsibility for sanctions
only to counsel); see also Cajamarca v. Regal Entm’t Grp., 2012 WL 3782437, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,
2012) (sanctioning counsel for failing to advise client to preserve social media information); Willoughby
et al., supra note 6, at 818 n.126 (citing Brick v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 04-CV-0129E(F), 2004 WL
1811430, at *3 n.29 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2004)) (sanctioning counsel, but not the client, because counsel’s
“disregard of discovery obligations . . . could not have been performed on behalf of his client”).
179 Allman, supra note 65, at 3.
180 See Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 815–16 (noting that counsel sanctions are increasing, but
still rare, occurring in only 30 of 401 sanction cases).
181 See id. at 818 n.126 (noting that only 4 of 30 attorney sanctions cases studied involved solely
attorney sanctions and not client sanctions).
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sanction does not resolve the parties’ dispute based on the objective merits. 182
Further, it is not a coincidence that a criticism of using Rule 1 as a lever to
promote change in litigation is the risk of deciding a case apart from its
merits.183 Sanctions for the use of outdated technology, like those for other
misconduct, may be better described as a forfeiture of a litigant’s opportunity
to participate in dispute resolution than a declaration regarding the merits of
the case.184
Such a forfeiture and its corresponding sanction should be rare, but
possible. Courts can make an example of litigants in such a way that other
attorneys will take notice and shore up deficiencies that they may have with
technology.185
Retired Judge Facciola summed up the idea of Rule 1 sanctions in the
context of a failed meet-and-confer. While noting that counsel sanctions for
discovery misconduct are rare, Judge Facciola opined:
[T]he time may have come for the federal judges to be less forgiving . . . . To be blunt, the
judge may have to conclude that the carrot of saving time and money by knowing what you
are doing is not working with a willfully ignorant lawyer, and it may be time to reach for the
stick. 186

III. EXAMPLES OF “LUDDITE SANCTIONS” BASED ON RULE 1
This Part describes two examples in which a court might sanction a
lawyer for failing to use available technology and creating waste: (1) a failure
182 See Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENVER L. REV. 407, 412 (2010), for a
thorough analysis of what “on the merits” means: “[Sanctions rules] are excluded from the definition [of
“on the merits”] because they are designed to serve a purpose other than assuring the parties a full
opportunity to participate in the case.”
183 See, e.g., Mark Meltzer, Having Fun with Rule 1, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 2005, at 24 (“One of the
overriding principles of the law—and of Rule 1—is that cases should be decided on the merits rather than
on
technicalities.”
(citing
Schiavone
v.
Fortune,
477
U.S.
21,
27
(1986),
https://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/1105HavingFun.pdf))).
184 See Tidmarsh, supra note 182, at 412. Professor Tidmarsh continued in a footnote:
This fact does not mean that the enforcement of sanctions against those who violate the rules
is necessarily precluded. The “on the merits” principle guarantees the opportunity to
participate, not the right of actual participation. Parties can forfeit their opportunity.
Implementing the sanctions provided in a rule against a violator does not offend the “on the
merits” principle unless the court, in enforcing the rule, considers matters other than the nature
of, and reasons for, a party’s forfeiture of that opportunity (such as the need to clear dockets).
In this sense, the “on the merits” principle does not prevent courts from upholding their dignity
against violators.
Id. at n.21.
185 See McMorrow et al., supra note 83, at 1426 (“While much of the litigation action occurs outside
the courtroom, judges set the norms for that out-of-court litigation conduct through the signals that they
send and the sanctions they impose for conduct that occurs during pretrial conferences, discovery motions,
and other pre- and post-trial activity.”).
186 3rd Annual Federal Judges Survey, supra note 29, at 14.
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to use predictive coding to review documents and (2) a failure to produce
documents in electronic form.
A.

Analytics and Predictive Coding: The Duty to Automate

Predictive coding is a disruptive technology used by lawyers to identify
relevant information in discovery. 187 Predictive coding is technology that uses
computer algorithms and machine learning to identify relevant and irrelevant
documents in a data set, without the time and expense of human review. 188
Lawyers use this technology by reviewing a sample of a large set of
documents, and a computer algorithm determines a larger set of relevant
documents based on this sample review. 189 This technology has proven to be
faster, more accurate, and less expensive than traditional linear review, where
attorneys look at every page of a set of documents from start to finish. 190 A
concept search relates documents by ideas and structure, making it more
powerful than a simple Boolean keyword search. 191 Concept searching can
find relevant documents that don’t necessarily contain specific words,
making this searching similar to human review. 192
Many lawyers accept these technologies today. But that was not so until
fairly recently. Initially, lawyers were hesitant to risk their reputation and
clients’ money on a technology that does not have widespread acceptance
across the bench.193 Further, there was a sense that letting a computer program
choose relevant documents was like letting the autopilot drive; numbers be
damned, turning over that control is scary. 194 Also, while it is less expensive
and more accurate than painstaking human review, 195 “even vendors of search
187

See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 39, at 3047 (“Predictive coding has fundamentally
transformed the prospects for ediscovery.”).
188 See Jackson, supra note 8, at 398 n.19 (“Predictive coding and technology-assisted review are
terms that are also often used interchangeably, but ‘Predictive Coding does not equal Automated Review;
it is simply one of several techniques to accomplish it.’” (quoting Sandra E. Serkes, What’s the Difference
Between Automated Review and Predictive Coding?, VALORA TECH. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012, 3:00 PM),
http://valoratech.blogspot.com/2012/04/whats-difference-between-automated.html.).
189 See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 39, at 3047.
190 See Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 28.
191 See id. at 29.
192 See id. at 30 (“Concept searching could locate relevant ESI that relates to, rather than contains,
specific words.”).
193 See id. at 31.
194 Jackson, supra note 8, at 399 (“Although the potential for human error is also present in a manual
review, there is the perception that a manual review permits a greater degree of understanding and control
by the reviewing attorneys, thereby reducing the risk that complete categories of relevant documents will
not be properly identified.” (footnote omitted)).
195 See Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“In the three years since
Da Silva Moore, the case law has developed to the point that it is now black letter law that where the
producing party wants to utilize TAR for document review, courts will permit it.”); L. Casey Auttonberry,
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technology software are quick to point out that search technology is not a
solution in and of itself, and it only is as effective as the imagination and
adeptness of the lawyer using it.” 196
Lawyer imagination and adeptness in using predictive coding should be
more prevalent in the future. Encouraging this result is a growing sentiment
that first-line document review is not in and of itself legal work that must
necessarily be performed by a lawyer, notwithstanding the classic toil of firstyear associates.197 A recognition that document review of that nature is not
legal work reinforces the idea that contracting or delegating that work to nonlawyers or machine algorithms does not violate any ethical duty to clients. 198
If that delegation does not violate any ethical duty to the client, then a lawyer
may violate a different ethical duty—and Rule 1—when she does not
delegate the work and instead performs the review at high hourly rates. 199
This tension is the genesis of the old legal phrase, “if I ask you for the time,
don’t build me a clock.”
So, could not using computer-assisted review violate Rule 1? Perhaps
in certain circumstances. The sentiment already exists that “[c]oncept-based
review of documents arguably allows for a speedier review with increased
chances of spotting relevant documents in context with one another and the
document set as a whole, thereby furthering the directives of FRCP 1.” 200
Given the current expense and lack of understanding of this technology,

Predictive Coding: Taking the Devil Out of the Details, 74 LA. L. REV. 613, 615 (2013); R. Eric Hutz, EDiscovery: Using Predictive Coding to Manage E-Discovery Costs and Risks, INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 23,
2012),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/02/23/e-discovery-using-predictive-coding-to-manage-edi?t=e-discovery.
196 Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 33–34.
197 See Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 620 F. App’x 37, 45 (2d Cir. 2015)
(holding that document review by contract attorney is not the practice of law where reviewer was under
such time constraint that reviewer did not use legal judgment).
198 This ethical duty is codified in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct at Rule 5.3, but is also
a common law duty:
Under common law principles, a court may hold a lawyer responsible for a nonlawyer
assistant’s conduct in imposing sanctions or when enforcing deadlines. As an agency law
matter, a lawyer may be liable for an assistant’s errors committed in the scope of the assistant’s
employment. Liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior is a settled aspect of tort
law. Finally, but critically, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3 and equivalent state rules
frequently prohibit lawyers from disavowing responsibility for assistants’ conduct in the
context of professional discipline by imposing broad supervisory responsibilities on lawyers.
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted Model Rule 5.3 in whole or part .
...
Douglas R. Richmond, Watching Over, Watching Out: Lawyers’ Responsibilities for Nonlawyer
Assistants, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 441, 442 (2012) (citations omitted).
199 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 8, at 398 (“In determining whether the use of predictive coding is
consistent with the [ethical] requirement of [Model Ethics] Rule 1.5 that an attorney charge a reasonable
fee and not collect an unreasonable amount for expenses, its cost-effective nature would certainly weigh
in favor of its use.”).
200 Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 33.
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sanctions are unlikely at the moment, but not for long. 201 A leading vendor
has already suggested that the use of predictive coding will become an ethical
obligation.202 “Ultimately, the technology may become so cheap and so
ubiquitous that litigants may demand” that keyword and concept searching
“be adopted as an essential part of most e-discovery.”203 Commentators
predict “firms using some form of predictive coding in essentially all largescale litigation within the next decade.”204
Sanctions for a luddite attorney who fails to use predictive coding,
beyond cost shifting, would likely be in the form of a certification that
technological processes have been implemented in future cases. Such
sanctions are in line with common nonmonetary discovery sanctions on
counsel for misconduct. 205 Monetary sanctions can be a weak deterrent. For
example, in the HM Electronics206 case, the court imposed monetary
sanctions and did not see improvement in discovery conduct, suggesting that
sanctions with more “teeth” were necessary. 207
B.

Failure to Produce in Searchable Form: The Duty to OCR

Another potential luddite sanction area is in the form of production of
documents. The Rules require the parties in a case to discuss the form in
which they will produce documents. 208 To that end, a requesting party can
and should request a certain form of production. If the parties do not reach
an agreement, the Rules prescribe that documents be produced in one of two
ways: either in the form in which they are “ordinarily maintained,” or in
“reasonably useable form.”209 It is widely understood that electronic
201

See Jackson, supra note 9, at 399 n.25 (citing Matt Miller, Order Highlights Potential Costs of
Predictive Coding, DISCOVER READY (Mar. 19, 2013), http://discoverready.com/blog/order-highlightspotential-costs-of-predictive-coding/).
202 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer for E-discovery Company Predicts Predictive Coding Will
Become an Ethical Obligation, ABA J. L. NEWS NOW (Dec. 6, 2012, 12:15 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer_for_ediscovery_company_predicts_predictive_coding/.
203 Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery by Keyword Search, PRAC. LITIGATOR, May 2004, at 7, 16.
204 McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 39, at 3048.
205 See, e.g., Willoughby et al., supra note 6, at 823 n.150.
206 No. 12cv2884–BAS–MDD, 2015 WL 4714908 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015).
207 Id. at *32 (“The imposition of [cost shifting] monetary sanctions had, at best, a fleeting effect on
Defendants and their attorneys.”).
208 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C).
209 See
10.0
Form
or
Forms
of
Production,
SEDONA
CONF.,
https://thesedonaconference.org/node/4314 (“FRCP 34(b)(2)(E)(i) directs that a ‘party must produce
documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label them to correspond
with the categories in the request . . .’ []. However, FRCP 34(a)(1)(A) also permits the discovery of ‘any
documents or electronically stored information . . . after translation by the responding party into a
reasonably usable form . . .’ []. Thus, the default form of production should be the form in which the ESI
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information must be produced in an electronically searchable form for it to
be “reasonably useable” under the Rules. 210 “Searchable” means that the set
of documents is either produced in native application format or with metadata
that allows the receiving party to run text and Boolean searches against it,
providing accurate results. 211
This requirement sounds simple enough, but becomes trickier when
information is stored in multiple forms. A responding party generally cannot
permissibly take information that is searchable and remove that capability,
producing it in non-searchable form. 212 What, then, of the party that stores
information in multiple forms and intentionally produces it in the least
convenient form? Or the party who takes non-searchable documents, makes
them searchable for her own use, but then produces them in non-searchable
form to “avoid doing work for the other side”? Is such conduct sanctionable?
Maybe. Searchable electronic data is standard, and has been for a while.
It would be easy to see a court requiring production of any electronically
stored information in searchable form absent special circumstances, and
sanctioning any party who fails to comply.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: BUILDING AN INCENTIVE TO INNOVATE
With so much effort expended to prescribe technological competence,
one should consider the question: why is it so hard for lawyers to stay abreast
of technology? Because to get by, they have not had to, and it is in some
senses easier for market leaders to stifle innovation rather than to upgrade to
innovative processes.213 There is a lack of incentive to innovate that is fairly
simple. The risks of innovation outweigh the costs, at least in the present
state.214 Sanctions may change that, and this Part describes how they might.

is kept in the ‘usual course of business’ or, alternatively, in a ‘reasonably usable form.’” (alterations in
original)).
210 Id.
211 Ball, supra note 172, at 5–7 (adding that, when production is made in an image-based form,
“[s]earchable text is obtained either by extraction from an electronic source or, in the case of scanned
paper documents, by use of optical character recognition (OCR)”).
212 See, e.g., In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 665 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“It is
undisputed that the production ‘completed’ on June 30, 2007 had load file, metadata, page break and key
word search problems, making the 10 million pages of documents unaccessible, unsearchable, and
unusable as contemplated under the Rules.”).
213 See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 39, at 3042 (“The surest way for lawyers to retain the market
power of old is to use bar regulation to delay and obstruct the use of machine intelligence.”)
214 See, e.g., id. at 3064–65 (discussing the propensity for machine intelligence to face a backlash
because it challenges a “lawyers’ monopoly” of attorneys providing legal services without the use of the
latest technology).
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The Fallacy of Outcome Certainty

There is a prevailing sense in the legal industry that incorporating new
technology is expensive, 215 difficult,216 and time consuming. 217 But it is also
scary; lawyers do not want to change what works when the consequences for
errors while a process “works out the kinks” can be extremely severe. 218 The
basis for this reluctance is a fallacy that the old, tried, and true method,
though inefficient, is better than a newer, sleeker method that is less familiar.
This is a common fallacy that appears in other businesses that have had
varying degrees of difficulty innovating. 219 Disruptive technology can be a
negative for those lagging in technology, as taxi drivers may attest. 220 Legal
services are by no means immune from disruption and change. 221
Luddite lawyers would argue that their practice is different; litigation is
not a mere cab ride but an incredibly risky and nuanced professional service,
and attorneys have a legitimate concern about providing excellent service to
clients—a concern that may necessarily slow innovation. One commentator,
Blair Janis, sympathetically describes this view:

215 See Casey Flaherty, Lawyers and Technology: A Bad Marriage Gets Worse, 90 FLA. BAR J. 24,
24 (Jan. 2016), https://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa
900624829/43731f223ca0883f85257f2900501f00!OpenDocument (“Studies find that for every dollar
spent on new technology, enterprises must invest an additional $10 in organizational capital—training
and process redesign — to capture the technology’s full benefits.” (citing Erik Brynjolfsson & Lorin M.
Hitt, Computing Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence, MIT SLOAN SCH. OF MGMT. (June 2003),
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/5417/4210-01.pdf?sequence=2)).
216 ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Introduction and Overview, supra note 37, at 8 (2012)
(“[T]echnology is such an integral – and yet at times invisible – aspect of contemporary law practice.”).
217 See Flaherty, supra note 215 (“Related studies find that it, therefore, typically requires five to
seven years for an enterprise to properly integrate new technology.” (citing Timothy F. Bresnahan et al.,
Information Technology, Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level
Evidence, 117 Q.J. ECON. 339, 346 (2002))).
218 This is a difficult reality, especially for attorneys who practice fairly routine legal tasks. See
McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 39, at 3054 (noting that superstar lawyers will embrace machine
intelligence to further their capability, but “average lawyers will be disadvantaged”).
219 See
Clayton
Christensen,
Disruptive
Innovation,
CLAYTON
CHRISTENSEN,
http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/ (last visited July 12, 2016); Henry C. Lucas, Jr., Eight
Hard
Lessons
from
Disruption,
SMITH
BRAIN
TRUST
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/news/eight-hard-lessons-disruption (citing eight traps for organizations
facing disruptive technology).
220 See Michele R. Pistone & Michael B. Horn, Disrupting Law School: How Disruptive Innovation
Will
Revolutionize
the
Legal
World,
CLAYTON
CHRISTENSEN
(Mar.
2016),
http://www.christenseninstitute.org/publications/disrupting-law-school/, for a great example of
comparing the rise of ride-sharing services as a disruptive technology to traditional taxi services, and that
change’s relationship to legal education.
221 This is not necessarily a bad thing. See Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How
Technological Change in the Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to Justice, 78 ALA. L. REV.
553, 597–98 (2014/2015).
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While the technology around the legal world advances at an exponential rate, the technology
within the legal world, especially as it relates to lawyering (i.e., providing legal services as
opposed to running a law business), is much slower. There are good reasons for this. Lawyers
in general are risk averse. We need to be. One of the primary benefits of using a lawyer for
legal services is to obtain some level of guarantee that the advice or outcome of our services
will actually accomplish the purpose for which the services were provided. This places a heavy
burden of responsibility on lawyers to ensure not only that the actual services they provide but
also the manner in which they provide these services will not in some way increase the risk of
breaching this important obligation.
For each new technological advance, a high level of analysis and review is needed before
lawyers can implement it. Our professional obligations demand that we not take risks, so we
tend to stick with what we know works. This creates tension between the risk aversion in the
legal profession and the ever-changing expectations and demands of legal service consumers.
222

Mr. Janis’s driving point is that law firms will traditionally lag behind
non-firm legal service providers due to the ethical and practical
considerations stymieing innovation. But his points about outcome certainty
are not lost. The issue with such reasoning is that it creates a conflict with the
attorney’s ethical, practical, and rules-prescribed duty to employ technology
capably so as to keep costs down and cases moving.
A broader point raised by Mr. Janis’s article should be considered:
namely, that a luddite attorney may have at least a subjectively (if not
objectively) legitimate concern with new technology, and may consider that
concern heavier than the pressure to innovate. Indeed, any judge weighing
Rule 1 sanctions for luddite lawyering is likely to see this argument and
should weigh it carefully. While such an argument may be persuasive in the
face of brand-new technology (such as the predictive coding of ten years
ago), that argument is generally unpersuasive for technology that has
achieved general acceptance (such as the cloud storage of documents, e-mail,
and predictive coding of today). Technology that is safe, efficient, and
accepted must be used by attorneys, unless its use is inappropriate for the
matter involved. A distinction thus should be made between a prudent
attorney who may object to predictive coding because it costs too much and
an imprudent luddite attorney who objects to predictive coding because it is
not safe, does not work, or cannot be understood. The increased emphasis on
and requirement of technological competence makes even well-reasoned
obstinacy to new methods more akin to pushing against a current than
remaining in a safe harbor. There comes a point at which attorneys can no
longer afford to delay innovation.
Not adopting technology appears to be doing nothing, but is also itself
a decision with risk and benefit. 223 Sanctioning luddite attorneys increases the

222 Blair Janis, How Technology Is Changing the Practice of Law, 31 GP SOLO, May/June 2014,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2014/may_june/how_technology_changing_practice_
law.html.
223 Id.
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risk of doing nothing, which makes the avoidance of innovation less of a
reasonable choice.
2.

The Interia of Law Firm Structure

Another reason why lawyers struggle with innovation is structural. Law
firms focus their professional development on substantive knowledge and
experiential learning, treating technology as a means to an end. For example,
one commentator with experience in the technology side of law firms noted
that large firms often keep the professional development and technology
teams separate.224 This is a curious choice because “[b]oth perform learning
and development functions, and yet they are usually in two different
departments that work alone . . . [t]hey frequently even have two different
systems that contain learning resources and perform analysis of its use.” 225
The result of this split is that technology training teams often lack a voice in
attorney development. 226 As the ABA pointed out, changing technology can
be “invisible” to professionals who are not constantly monitoring trends and
developments.227 Keeping technology separate from attorney training makes
it harder for the law firm to “see” changing technology.
This “siloing” cannot continue. If attorneys are held responsible for
staying abreast of technology, then increased technological competence is an
essential part of practice development. It is as important as substantive legal
knowledge. Law firms must therefore embrace the concept that they, like
other large businesses, must to some extent become a technology business. 228
Every attorney is now a technology professional.
224

See Michelle Spencer, Want to Improve Attorney Technology Use? Start by Breaking Down the
L&D Silos in Law Firms, LEGAL LEARNING DEV. NETWORK (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://legallearningnetwork.com/improve-attorney-technology-use-breaking-silos-law-firms/.
225 Id.
226 See id.
227 Introduction and Overview, supra note 37, at 8.
228 See, e.g., Joe McKendrick, Every Company Now a Technology Company: Latest Round of
Mergers
and
Acquisitions
Confirms
It,
FORBES
(Apr.
30,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joemckendrick/2015/04/30/every-company-now-a-technology-companylatest-round-of-mergers-and-aquisitions-confirms-it/#3e60f98a6d17 (“With the rise of cloud, Software as
a Service, and now, the Internet of Things (IoT), more organizations—in all types of businesses—
recognize they are evolving into technology and data companies. So they are creating both strategic and
tactical partnerships to try to make the most of this evolution.”). Examples abound. See, e.g., Pat Burke,
What Going Digital Means to IT and the Bottom Line, CIO INSIGHT (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://www.cioinsight.com/it-management/expert-voices/what-going-digital-means-to-it-and-thebottom-line.html (discussing the breakdown of boundaries between technology department and every
other department); McLaren Group Becomes McLaren Technology Group, MCLAREN TECH. GROUP (Jan.
13, 2015), http://www.mclaren.com/technologygroup/news/articles/mclaren-group-becomes-mclarentechnology-group/ (noting name change for racing company as reflective of its development into “a
diversified high-technology company”).
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A.

Sanctions Will Add Sufficient Risk to Overcome the Stubbornness

Luddite lawyers face a number of potential stubborn choices with
respect to advancing technology in litigation. They can ignore it, and “do
things the old-fashioned way,” hoping that the client will not mind, the other
party will not object, and that an overworked court will not notice. Or they
can adopt an ostrich approach, over-delegating tasks and lacking the proper
knowledge to effectively support their associates. 229 Or, perhaps most
insidiously, they can attack the new technology as unreliable, thus creating
extra work for everyone involved in the suit—but work that they actually
know how to perform.
How do we limit the attractiveness of these choices? The easiest
solution to the luddite lawyer problem is for lawyers to spend more time
learning technology. In discussing the revised Rule 1 and its effect on
attorney behavior, one commentator theorized that attorneys’ adoption of
Rule 1’s directives requires what Alexis de Tocqueville called an
“‘enlightened regard for themselves.’” 230 It could be described as a situation
where two parties exchange a short-term negative outcome for themselves
for a greater positive outcome for all. 231 However, not all attorneys have the
capacity or desire to be so enlightened. 232 Some attorneys will intentionally
or unintentionally slow technological progress under the guise that zealous
advocacy dictates a slow and steady approach. This approach helps attorneys
avoid an efficiency that might provide an adversary with an easier time
building an opposing case. 233
A sanctioned attorney is one who risks a client relationship. It is the
pressure of unhappy clients that truly will drive change. 234 Some
229

See Brown v. Tellermate Holdings Ltd., No. 2:11-cv-1122, WL 2985051 at *2, *26 (S.D. Ohio
July 1, 2014), modified, 2015 WL 4742686 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 2015) (sanctioning attorneys for failure
to monitor vendor and client in discovery and ignorance of discovery process); Metro. Opera Assoc. Inc.
v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union, 212 F.R.D. 178, 222, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(sanctioning improper delegation); Introduction and Overview, supra note 37, at 5.
230 II ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 149 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry Reeve
trans., 1862).
231 See Jana Landon, Can Amended Federal Rules Effective Mandate Cooperation?, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER
(Sept.
4,
2015),
http://www.stradley.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2015/The%20Legal%20Intelligencer%20%20Landon%20FRCP.pdf.
232 See id. (“We are, unfortunately, in an imperfect system with counsel who may be unwilling or
unable to meet this goal. “Just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of every civil action in the federal
courts is not always a party’s goal, and neither will be sharing information that has historically been treated
as attorney work product, such as search terms, custodian interviews for collection, and review
protocols.”).
233 See id.
234 See id. (“Any increase in cooperation will necessarily be client-driven. There will, of course,
always be situations where clients are interested solely in tenacious counsel who will fight every point for
an advantage, strategic or otherwise. Corporate clients, however, are increasingly demanding that their
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commentators note that predictive coding may become a business
requirement long before it becomes a legal requirement. 235 Sanctions will also
drive a stake into any set of clients and lawyers who collude to avoid adopting
technology, and others might be too comfortable with their own methods,
instead “sticking with what works.” A sanction would provide the bar with
the clearest signal that lawyers can, and should, lose clients because of a
failure to adopt technology. 236 Litigation, however, is almost never a oneparty activity, and as much as one would want, one cannot easily fire an
adversary’s attorney.
Further, the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility that prescribe
technological competence do not have enough “teeth” to provide adequate
incentives for lawyers to innovate. 237 Ethical violations are hard to pin on
attorneys and involve state authorities, meaning that a judge can only refer
the attorney to the state bar, where the lawyer may face no action. As one
commentator notes, “the reality regarding reputation information suggests
that professional rules . . . are archaic because they are too easily
circumvented and do not impose sufficient sanctions to provide real
deterrence.” 238
Rule 1 can help with the challenges of electronic discovery. Rule 1 was
designed to make litigation more efficient and reduce costs. As one
commentator aptly put it:
[L]itigants should be aggressive in invoking FRCP 1 as a basis for the innovative use of search
strategies and cost-shifting to increase efficiency and reduce costs across the board in

counsel engage cooperatively to reduce discovery costs and minimize disputes. Companies have long
realized that the waste associated with a ‘scorched earth’ approach may not be in their best interest.”). To
be fair, the decreased overall cost that technology brings will create similar market pressures to innovate.
But as has been shown herein, that innovation is not happening fast enough.
235 See Jackson, supra note 8, at 398 (opining that predictive coding may not be codified as an ethical
rule because it will become the norm “as a business requirement long before ethics rule-making bodies
have a chance to consider it” (quoting Jim Calloway, Will Predictive Coding in E-discovery Become an
Ethical Requirement?, JIM CALLOWAY’S L. PRAC. TIPS BLOG (Dec. 19, 2012, 11:57 AM),
http://www.lawpracticetipsblog.com/2012/12/will-predictive-coding-in-e-discovery-become-an-ethicalrequirement.html)).
236 See Lanctot, supra note 10, at 11 (referring to a lawyer’s lack of technological knowledge as a
“distinct competitive disadvantage” (quoting Joe Dysart, Catch Up with Tech or Lose Your Career, Judges
Warn
Lawyers,
A.B.A.
J.
NEWS
NOW
(Apr
1,
2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/catch_up_with_tech_or_lose_your_career_judges_warn_la
wyers)).
237 Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173,
209 (2008) (“We have already noted that some rules—particularly permissive rules and those that place
control of choices in lawyers’ hands—might need to be rewritten to take more realistic account of lawyers’
incentives.”).
238 Id. at 209–10.
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discovery. It is only in this way that the mandate of a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action will become a reality in discovery. 239

This is true, but the inference therein is that the only way that Rule 1
will become such a basis is for judges to use it to require the use of such
technology. Sanctioning luddite lawyers through the lens of Rule 1 and the
discovery rules is a means to that end.
B.

Sanctions Will Help Bring Faster Technological Change to Lawyering

If the anti-luddite regime is still trending, it is trending towards greater
importance. Looking forward, lawyers and ethics boards speculate that more
sanctions lurk in the fertile digital minefield of data security, 240 social media
misconduct,241 and, of course, the duty to preserve evidence. 242
If changing technology really is an “invisible” threat, as the ABA
noted,243 then the sleeping law firms truly need a “wake up call.” 244 The firms
239

Mazza et al., supra note 22, at 87.
See The Ethical Adventures of Luddite Lawyers, Podcast, LEGAL TALK NETWORK (Feb. 18,
2015), https://lawyerist.com/80711/podcast-the-ethical-misadventures-of-luddite-lawyers/. Sam Glover’s
podcast aptly notes and supports the following premises:
1. Without a certain amount of tech knowledge, [a lawyer] cannot adequately hire a security
consultant.
2. Basic technology competency is not taught in law school or college, and is not selfexplanatory.
3. Amateur hackers can easily access [a lawyer’s] client data in in public places like coffee
shops through open, unsecure networks.
4. Whether they like it or not, all lawyers are in the cloud, so they need to learn about
encryption and secure servers.
See also Safeguarding Your Firm from Cyber Attacks, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP (2012),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/law-firms/assets/pwc-safeguarding-your-firm-from-cyber-attacks.pdf (noting
that private attorneys and firms are prime targets for unauthorized intrusion by hackers). Additionally, the
California State Bar found in an opinion that an attorney doing client work on an unsecured wireless
network (say, at a coffee shop) “risks violating his duties of confidentiality and competence in using the
wireless connection at the coffee shop to work on Client’s matter unless he takes appropriate precautions,
such as using a combination of file encryption, encryption of wireless transmissions and a personal
firewall.” Cal. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 179 7 (2010).
241 See, e.g., John G. Browning, Ethics and the Use of Technology, ST. BAR OF TEX. 8–10 (2014),
http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/13099/164279_01.pdf (first citing In re Peshek, No.
6201779 (Ill. Atty. Reg. & Disc. Comm’n 2009) (suspending attorney for blog posts); then citing In re
Carpenter, 95 P.3d 203, 206, 210 (Or. 2004) (en banc) (reprimanding attorney for online social media
prank); and then citing In re Hursey, 719 S.E.2d 670, 672, 675 (S.C. 2011) (factoring social media posts
in disbarment proceeding)).
242 See id. at 13 (citing Lester v. Allied Concrete, 736 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Va. 2013)) (suspending
lawyer for five years for advising client to “clean up” his Facebook page).
243 Introduction and Overview, supra note 37, at 8.
244 Lanctot, supra note 10, at 10 (quoting Matt Nelson, New Changes to Model Rules A Wake-Up
Call For Technologically Challenged Lawyers, INSIDE COUNS. (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/03/28/new-changes-to-model-rules-a-wake-up-call-for-tech).
240
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lagging far enough behind in technological competence may not even know
they are lagging behind. 245 Sanctions will send that message, as their purpose
is “to serve as a specific deterrent to achieve compliance with the particular
discovery order at issue, and . . . to serve as a general deterrent in the case at
hand and in other litigation, provided that the party against whom sanctions
are imposed was in some sense at fault.” 246
The HM Electronics case cited previously provides an example. There,
the court sanctioned client and counsel where they failed to issue a litigation
hold, failed to produce relevant documents, and counsel made numerous
misrepresentations to the court. 247 Among other misconduct, the defendants
produced very little and realized too late they should have produced much
more.248 Notably, the court cited counsel’s simplistic description of ESI
collection and production efforts:
In the court-ordered meet and confer [] in response to Plaintiff’s question about the
methodology used to collect documents in light of the small amount of responsive documents
produced, [defendant's attorney] explained simply “I didn’t conduct the ESI search, so I don’t
know the methodology. They were told to look for documents on their computer.” 249

The court found this response to be wholly inadequate, and stated that
counsel should have understood the technological challenges of an adequate
response and sought an extension of time from the court to respond. 250 In this
case, it appears that counsel was in some sense willingly ignorant of
electronic discovery technology. 251 The sanctions in the HM case were
described in legal circles as “stunning,”252 a “remind[er]” to “take e-discovery

245 The author of this Article can provide one anecdotal example from his time in practice: In 2015
he heard from another attorney’s client that the cost to the client of comparing an old electronic version
of a document to the new electronic version would be enormous, given its size and length. The author
recommended “running a blackline” on the document, and was told that if the other attorney had to
perform such a process, it would take hours. The process takes seconds with a “Compare” option present
in Microsoft Word.
246 Rodriguez & Mann, supra note 171, at 11.
247 HM Elecs. v. R.F. Techs., Inc., No. 12-cv-2884-BAS-MDD, 2015 WL 4714908, at *35 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 7, 2015).
248 Id. at *8.
249 Id. at *14.
250 Id. at *18.
251 See id. at *14.
252 Recommind Article, supra note 9.
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responsibility seriously,”253 and, especially, a “wake up call.”254 More
sanctions like those in the HM case will start a current that luddite lawyers
can only push against for a certain amount of time. While it seems draconian
to expose luddite attorneys for their failure to adopt technology, the
technology is not slowing down; it is speeding up. The legal industry should
consider sanctions as a method to further encourage innovation and minimize
disruption.
CONCLUSION
The quotation from Professor Stephen Gillers at the beginning of this
article aptly laid out the two choices the legal industry faces with respect to
changing technology: the industry can impede technology or adapt to use it.
That is no choice, really, from a systemic perspective. Lawyers must not
impede, but must adapt. No lawyer in modern times should be ignorant of
her ethical and practical duty to keep abreast of new practice technology.
Extreme increases in the cost of discovery have made that duty more
pronounced and difficult, to the point where lawyers need to obtain an
objectively advanced understanding of information systems to do their jobs
adequately. This point can be lost on attorneys who overvalue the
dependability of tested and true processes. In an hourly billing system, those
processes are simply too inefficient to be acceptable. Losing clients for
inefficiency is not a sufficient result where, in litigation, a luddite’s obstinacy
can create system inefficiency and unnecessary cost for all parties and the
court. Sanctioning lawyers who refuse to keep up with technology will force
luddites to operate at a professional level that will meet Rule 1’s edict that
lawyers ensure that litigation be “just, speedy, and inexpensive.”

253

Christopher Benning & Daniel Toal, E-Discovery Competence of Counsel Criticized in Sanctions
Decision, N.Y. L. J. (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3184760/boehning_toal__ediscovery_competence_of_counsel_criticized_in_sanctions_decision__10_6_2015.pdf. The authors
noted:
HM Electronics and the California ethics opinion should remind practitioners and their clients
that judges may very well, and should, take e-discovery responsibilities seriously. Whether
during the initial triage of litigation hold and preservation notifications, during the postdiscovery clean-up phase, or anywhere in between, counsel owe their clients, their adversaries,
the courts, and themselves a certain level of e-discovery competence and responsibility. . . .
Serious consequences may lie in wait for counsel and clients alike who fail to take seriously
judges’ expectations for how they conduct themselves throughout the discovery process. A
lack of competence, reasonable inquiry, supervision, or cooperation may, as it did in HM
Electronics, land a party—and its counsel—in hot water.
Id.
254 Judge Issues Sanctions Order as ‘Wake-up Call’ to Attorneys, ARMA NEWSWIRE (Sept. 23,
2015),
http://www.arma.org/r1/news/newswire/2015/09/23/judge-issues-sanctions-order-as-wake-upcall-to-attorneys (“The order, which included monetary sanctions as well as a recommendation that
sanctions and an adverse inference instruction be imposed on the defendants, is being described as a
‘wake-up call’ to attorneys to become competent in e-discovery.”).

